THE Nation

AMERICA'S LEADING LIBERAL WEEKLY SINCE 1865

VOLUME 158 NEW YORK · SATURDAY · JUNE 24, 1944 NUMBER 26

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Published weekly and copyright, 1944, in the U. S. A. by The Nation Associates, Inc., 20 Vesey St., New York 7, N. Y. Entered as second-class matter, December 13, 1879, at the Post Office of New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879. Washington Editorial Bureau: 318 Kellogg Building.

The Shape of Things

THE LONG-AWAITED PACIFIC OFFENSIVE HAS begun on a scale that a year ago would have been regarded as utterly fantastic. As a powerful American force launched its attack on the advanced Japanese base at Saipan, B-29 Superfortresses struck at the great steel works at Yawata in the industrial heart of Japan, Liberators carried out bombing attacks of unprecedented fury against Truk, Yap, and Palau, and a carrier-based force hit the Bonin Islands, 650 miles southeast of Tokyo. On the days immediately preceding the Saipan landing, all the more important islands in the Mariana group were subjected to heavy air and sea attacks, and another naval task force bombarded Paramushiru, Shimushu, and Matsua in the Kuriles, 1,000 miles north of the Japanese capital. At the same time other Allied bombers delivered exceptionally heavy blows against Japanese bases at Rabaul and Bougainville and along the New Guinea coast. While some of these coordinated attacks merely represented the necessary softening up for so ambitious an enterprise as a penetration into the heart of the Marianas, the scale of the operations indicated that further and perhaps even more sensational steps may be expected in the immediate future. With Saipan and Biak in our hands, an attack on the Philippines becomes possible, and the promised drive to the China coast may materialize before the end of 1944.

*

TWO WEEKS AFTER INVASION THE AMERICAN contribution to the UNRRA is still to be appropriated by Congress. Our share has been set at $800,000,000, of which $450,000,000 is to be an outright grant and the remainder in the form of lend-lease credit. Both items have already been approved by the Senate, but the House has voted only the first. Unless it now concurs in the Senate action, the appropriation bill may be delayed still longer by wranglings in conference. Yet with the invasion progressing there is urgent need for the UNRRA to buy stocks of food and clothing and make other preparations. The task facing it is already formidable; it will certainly be enlarged by wholesale destruction during the final phases of the Battle of Europe. Nor is this fact to be gainsaid because certain correspondents have described Normandy as a "land of

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plenty." It is easy to believe that local supplies of food in the neighborhood of our beachheads are ample for the population that remains there, but this provides no clue to general conditions in France. Normandy is the Wisconsin of France, producing large surpluses of butter, cheese, meat, and other farm products for export. With its communications with the rest of the country smashed, a local backing up of supplies is only to be expected. Moreover, there is a temporary glut of meat owing to the slaughter of livestock by shells and bombs. This in turn suggests that even Normandy may be short of food in the near future. And while, as a Reuter correspondent reports, a few country-houses may have full wardrobes, the inhabitants of towns like Caen, which the Germans are defending house by house, are faced with the total loss of their homes and possessions. They are in dire need of the assistance of the UNRRA.

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ON THE SOIL OF YUGOSLAVIA LIBERATED by the armies of Marshal Tito an accord has been reached between King Peter's exiled government and the National Liberation Committee. The representative sent out by the London government was the liberal Dr. Ivan Subasich, whose appointment to ministerial rank some weeks ago coincided with the dropping of Mihailovich from the Cabinet. Although pressure was undoubtedly applied to King Peter by the British government, the greatest credit must go to the unconquered Yugoslav people, who, fighting for the freedom of their country, demanded full recognition of those leaders in whom they have put their trust. The accord will almost certainly bring into closer coincidence the military and political aims of the forces of liberation of Southeastern Europe. An almost forgotten footnote to the larger issue is the inevitable elimination of Constantin Fotich from his post as Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington. As Bogdan Raditsa pointed out in *The Nation* for January 9, ever since the Mihailovich-Tito rift appeared in the open Fotich has acted frankly as a one-man propaganda bureau for Mihailovich and attacked the Partisans as Communist bands. He turned openly anti-British after Churchill's recognition of Tito and worked with the most reactionary Poles in attacking Russia. Fotich represented a fiction which finally fell apart but which for a time fooled our State Department and thus controlled American policy. Now it becomes clear that the strength of Yugoslavia is not in a small nationalist ruling class but in the people.

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THE PLAN FOR WORLD ORGANIZATION which has been advanced with the President's blessing closely conforms to the principles suggested several weeks ago by Secretary Hull and Prime Minister Churchill. So far as the plan goes, there is little to which either an isolationist or an ardent believer in collective security can take exception. The crucial question of how the organization's decisions are to be enforced is left largely to the imagination. Mr. Roosevelt's rather extreme language in rejecting "a super-state with its own police force and other paraphernalia of coercive power" strongly suggests, however, that no real effort is being made to create machinery strong enough to cope with disputes between the major powers. It is generally understood that collective military force will be employed against a potential aggressor only when the "Big Four" are in complete agreement. Such a program has the virtue of being based on the realities of existing cooperation among the United Nations. It probably represents the most that can be hoped for in the immediate postwar period. But as a permanent plan for the preservation of peace its weaknesses should be obvious to anyone who lived through the tragic 1930's, when short-range national interests prevented any of the powers from accepting the responsibility of checking aggression.

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THE SWEEPING SUCCESS OF THE C. C. F. IN THE Saskatchewan election leaves no doubt as to the destination of this remarkable Canadian movement. Now, for the first time, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation will form the government of an important Canadian province. Tomorrow it will put in its challenge to become the government of Canada. Opposed by one of the most powerful Liberal Party machines in the country, the C. C. F. captured forty-three out of fifty-two seats, allowing the Liberals only five, with four seats still in doubt. The Progressive Conservatives did not take a single seat of the thirty-eight they contested. In popular vote the C. C. F. polled considerably more than the other two parties combined. The outcome of this election is a striking confirmation of the article, Canada Swings Left, by David Lewis in *The Nation* of June 10, and proves that the agrarian West more than matches the industrial East in popular insistence upon an advanced program of social planning. The new government will be led by the capable forty-year-old T. C. Douglas, since 1935 a member of the Canadian House of Commons. There is perhaps an omen in the fact that the C. C. F. captured the Prince Albert constituency which is represented in the Canadian Parliament by Prime Minister Mackenzie King. American liberals, in congratulating the C. C. F., will find in its magnificent victory inspiration for their own struggle for economic and social progress.

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READERS OF VICE-PRESIDENT WALLACE'S challenging new pamphlet, "Our Job in the Pacific," will readily understand why he was chosen for the difficult mission to Chungking. The pamphlet, just published by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, shows that the Vice-President has an extraor-

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dinary grasp of the fundamental forces that are shaping the Asia of tomorrow. He explodes the myth that Asia may become a dangerous competitor—pointing out that industry must continue to play a subordinate role for years to come, and that the primary task of the immediate post-war period must be a substantial increase in agricultural production. He warns us that efforts to push either industrialization or public-health measures too rapidly would intensify Asia's difficulties unless they were accompanied by improvements in agriculture. He then goes on to show how closely the economic problems of the East are intertwined with the colonial problem, and reveals great sympathy for the struggle of all Asiatic peoples for political and economic freedom. Since Asia's greatest economic need in the post-war years will be for large-scale projects for developing agriculture, transportation, and industry, America must think in terms of governmental aid rather than a system of uncontrolled private investments such as has already been repudiated by China.

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AN OUTLINE OF A POST-WAR PROGRAM HAS finally been submitted to the Senate by the Economic Policy and Planning Committee headed by Senator George. Although the committee's report is hardly more than a checklist of important items that must be considered in shaping post-war policy, its reactionary outlook is unmistakable. Its proposals for encouraging the creation of jobs by private enterprise consist mostly of admonitions to the government to keep hands off and not change the "rules of the game." It suggests, however, further investigation to find out what changes in corporate taxes should be made "to make ownership and equity investment more attractive," together with a study to discover "how much can be taxed away from the purchasing power of low-income groups." On the constructive side the committee has little to offer. It expects to report later on "home-building programs," but says nothing about urban reconstruction or public housing. Although approving in principle the idea of planning useful post-war public works, it recommends a post-war budget "to eliminate unnecessary expenditures." Not a word is to be found about the need for extending educational facilities or providing better medical care for the American people. Although the report illustrates the folly of expecting a Congressional committee to provide leadership in matters involving a high degree of technical information, its inadequacy must not be allowed to serve as an excuse for inaction.

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GOVERNOR DEWEY'S SOLDIER-VOTE RECORD deserves considerably more attention than it has received throughout the country. A survey recently made in four of the key Eastern states—Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York—reveals that under Mr. Dewey's "simple and workable" plan a much smaller number of service men are being qualified in New York than in the other states. As a result of a house-to-house canvass Pennsylvania expects to send a ballot to every one of its 1,000,000 men and women in service. New Jersey has already qualified 337,000 of its 375,000 service men and women. In Massachusetts it is estimated that at least 50 per cent of those in service will receive state ballots. But in New York, despite an extensive campaign by the C. I. O. to encourage service men to file their applications with the War Ballot Commission, only about 65,000 out of a prospective 1,000,000 voters have qualified. In New York City, where the larger part of the applications have been received, the Board of Elections is so shorthanded that it has been unable to process all applications that have come in. In spite of the difficulties of voting on the New York ballot, Mr. Dewey has consistently refused to accept the federal ballot for overseas soldiers, although the Republican governors of neighboring New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Vermont—who are not Presidential candidates—have agreed to count the federal ballots. Governor Dewey's stiff-necked rejection of any of the many proposals for facilitating service voting in New York can only be explained logically by the assumption that he expects little support from those who are risking their lives for their country. And if he persists in his present course, he will doubtless be proved right.

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CREDIT GOES TO CHARLES M. LAFOLLETTE, liberal Representative from Indiana, for his vigorous stand against any tie-up between the Indiana Republican Party and remnants of the Ku Klux Klan, once a powerful factor in state politics. In demanding the resignation of Robert M. Lyons, former state treasurer of the Klan, from his post of national committeeman, LaFollette said that he was "opposed to the domination of the Republican Party by anyone who has made a profit out of peddling racial and religious intolerance." Popular protest backed LaFollette, and Lyons resigned. Something more added to the good record of an excellent Congressman.

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WE WELCOME CHARLES G. BOLTE AS REGULAR contributor on military affairs. Beginning July 1, his critical reviews of special aspects of the military situation will appear frequently. *Nation* readers will recall his excellent article on General Montgomery in the issue of June 17. Mr. Bolté enlisted in the British army some months before the United States entered the war, served with the King's Royal Rifle Corps in the North African campaign, and was wounded at El Alamein. A student of military science, he has been serving for the past ten months on the military desk of the OWI.

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Who Is Out of Step?

ON JUNE 14 General Charles de Gaulle returned to French shores to receive a rapturous ovation from the conservative Normans. Earlier the same day, the A. P. had sent out a highly tendentious account of the French leader's cancelation of the orders of several hundred French officers scheduled to accompany the invasion. This report was dated not from General Eisenhower's headquarters but from Washington, and it was ascribed to high military officials in that city.

Dispatches from London soon proved the story incomplete and inaccurate: the mission had been planned as part of a civil and military agreement between the French Provisional Government and General Eisenhower —an agreement which the French, at least, had believed would surely precede invasion. But when D-Day came without any provision for civil administration in France by the French, De Gaulle decided that he could not allow the employment of French officers who would have no responsibility to his government. He was willing to lend interpreters and liaison officers, but if the AMG was going to rule the liberated areas it could not expect to do so under a false cloak of French authority.

Unhappily the explanation of his not unreasonable stand cannot obliterate the damage done by the original story. "De Gaulle refuses to cooperate" does not make a pretty headline, and now the General is being called "untrustworthy" and accused of disloyalty to the Allies. In the same way his refusal to indorse the "invasion francs" which the Allied command is issuing is being held against him: he is, it is alleged, making difficulties by instilling distrust of this money among the French people. But how can he authorize this currency when his authority as head of the French Provisional Government is not recognized? We cannot have it both ways. We cannot expect at one and the same time to disparage De Gaulle's leadership and to obtain full value from it.

The aid which our invasion forces are receiving from the French underground groups, the vast majority of which are closely linked to the Algiers government, has been praised by General Eisenhower. In a special communiqué issued June 17 he declared that in the past two weeks "the army of the French forces of the interior has increased both in size and in the scope of its activities." Sabotage of communications, he said, effectively coordinated with Allied operations, has considerably delayed the movement of German reserves. In other places the *maquis* are fighting openly. This is risky work undertaken by poorly armed men who, if captured, must expect to be shot. Can we afford to dampen their enthusiasm by slighting their acknowledged leader and leaving our plans for France open to misinterpretation?

There is only one way out of the present mess, as almost everyone but Mr. Roosevelt now seems to realize —recognition of the French Provisional Government and its assignment to the task of civil administration in the liberated areas. Four of the governments in exile have expressed their feelings on the matter by granting such recognition. The British press seems almost unanimous on the question. Pleading for indulgence of the House of Commons, which was pressing him for a definite statement on the situation, Mr. Churchill said it was necessary to consider the United States and its relations with the French committee and suggested that any discussion would merely "emphasize any differences which may exist." Could he have said any more plainly that his hands were tied by Washington? General Eisenhower himself, it has frequently been asserted, is anxious to come to terms with De Gaulle but cannot exceed his instructions from the Commander-in-Chief. E. C. Wilson, our representative at Algiers, is said to have resigned because he was thwarted in his attempts to reach an understanding with the French. Is, then, everyone out of step except Mr. Roosevelt?

Invasion—First Round

THE first three crises of the Allied landing in Normandy have been met and passed successfully. As this is written, the Cotentin Peninsula has been cut off, the deep-water port of Cherbourg is within the Allied grasp, and the fourth crisis—the enemy's strategic counter-attack—has still not developed. When it has been successfully met, we shall know that the Allied team is in Western Europe to stay.

The first crisis, the actual landing and the breaching of the Atlantic Wall, was passed with a good deal less difficulty than the Allied commanders had apparently expected. The scare talk about blood baths has proved unfounded, as so much of the scare talk in this war has previously proved: casualties so far announced are certainly not what many of us feared from this most difficult of all military operations.

The second crisis was passed quickly when the beachheads were consolidated into a single eighty-mile foothold and the enemy's local forces were defeated. In the face of terrible weather and determined opposition this was a signal achievement; and it was recognized as such by the German radio, which began to talk about the "decisive battle" of Europe being fought *west of the Rhine*—a damaging admission.

The third crisis was successfully passed last week when the enemy's tactical reserves were repulsed. Counter-attacks were violent and widespread all the way from Troarn on the extreme left flank to Montebourg on the extreme right flank. But when this phase developed, it again was in no such strength as had been anticipated,

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in that no really decisive and carefully mounted offensive was made; and the pattern of these counter-attacks revealed two very serious errors on the enemy's part—bad intelligence and bad handling of the available force.

First, the enemy mistook the main line of the Allied drive, apparently thinking it was aimed through Caen on the left. Actually Caen proved the pivot of a great wheeling movement through the Cerisy Forest in the center and the base of the Cotentin Peninsula on the right; Caen was merely a holding action. The Germans then had to whistle up reserves from Brittany to make a stand on the west coast of the peninsula, too late.

Second, the error in intelligence was compounded when the enemy tried to hold us all along the perimeter of our foothold, which was and is steadily expanding. Elements of four panzer divisions were thrown into action between Caen and Villers-Bocage. Thus the German armor, which alone could have broken through to the sea and split our position in two, was committed piecemeal and rendered incapable of striking a decisive blow. Once committed, it could not be withdrawn and reformed for a concentrated attack because the enemy lacked sufficient infantry to hold ground and cover the armored preparation.

Thus the enemy lost his first and best chance to throw the Allies into the sea—actually lost it by default. Tactically, this phase is very revealing: it seems to show that Rommel's over-impetuosity is again serving the Allied cause as it did in Africa. Strategically, it reveals the fear of the Germans that Eisenhower had not yet thrown his real punch; so that they were unwilling to rush too many troops to Normandy lest another landing elsewhere find them uncovered.

By the time this appears in print the strategic counter-attack will probably have started. The great Allied success in weathering the first three crises of the landing gives solid ground for confidence in the outcome of this fourth critical phase in Europe's beginning liberation.

Insurance Is Commerce

THE Supreme Court's decision in the fire-insurance case has been grossly oversimplified and badly misconstrued not only by the press but by so distinguished a legal historian as Charles Warren. The decision permitting the Department of Justice to proceed against a fire-insurance combination under the anti-trust laws was rendered four to three, Roberts and Reed abstaining. Mr. Warren in an article for the New York *Times* has learnedly demonstrated that this is the first time the court has departed from a rule established in 1834 under Marshall, a rule that the court will not decide a constitutional case except by majority vote. It is true that the decision was concurred in by only four justices, but a closer reading shows that on the constitutional point involved—whether Congress has power to regulate insurance under the commerce clause—the seven participating justices were unanimous. The split came not on a constitutional question, the right of Congress to regulate, but on a question of statutory interpretation, the question of whether the Sherman Act applies to insurance companies.

The dissenters in the fire-insurance case were the Chief Justice and Justices Frankfurter and Jackson. The press would not have gone so far astray if it had noted that on the very same day that the fire-insurance decision was handed down, the entire court, speaking through Frankfurter, with only Roberts abstaining, held that an insurance company was sufficiently in interstate commerce to be subject to the authority of the National Labor Relations Board. The combination alleged by the Department of Justice in the fire-insurance case constitutes a far heavier obstruction to interstate commerce than any conceivable labor dispute in an insurance-company office. The minority in the fire-insurance case did not question the power of Congress to regulate insurance and was as prepared as the majority to reverse the seventy-five-year-old decision in *Paul* v. *Virginia* that the issuance of an insurance policy "is not a transaction of commerce." The minority's dissent was based on the view (1) that Congress did not intend the anti-trust laws to cover insurance; (2) that their extension to insurance companies is a question of policy, to be decided by legislation, not by judicial decision; and (3) that as a practical matter it is unwise to upset state regulation of insurance at a time when the only available federal weapon is the blunderbuss of the Sherman Act. In our opinion, the first argument is factually correct, the second theoretically sound, the third rather dubious.

The necessarily broad dicta of the earlier Supreme Court decisions now haunting us were handed down in an effort to prevent the insurance companies from escaping state regulation. Forty years ago insurance companies were proposing federal regulation as a means of evading supervision by the states, and liberals like Brandeis were fighting it. But today state regulation has become extraordinarily weak and frequently corrupt. Given the more flexible and realistic conception of federal-state relations which obtains in the courts, the solution is both to strengthen state regulation and to supplement it with federal, as we do in dealing with public utilities. Though the anti-trust laws are hardly suited to the complex job of regulating insurance companies, they may be a valuable weapon in combating such extortionate combinations as the one alleged in this case of the Southeastern Underwriters' Association. Some may deplore the Black majority decision as judicial legislation, but it will be a blow to the powerful and unscrupulous insurance lobby in Washington and provide a basis for correcting some long-standing abuses.

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Mr. Willkie's Challenge

BY KEITH HUTCHISON

WITH a young candidate in prospect, the Republicans as they converge on Chicago are advertising themselves as the party of youth. Rejoicing at the signs of disintegration and decay in the Democratic ranks, they suggest that an old and weary Administration will prove a pushover for a G. O. P. that is as spry as ever it was.

Mr. Willkie does not agree. In the course of a series of articles outlining his ideas for the Republican 1944 platform he indicates his belief that the G. O. P., far from showing signs of renewed youth, is in fact exhibiting the symptoms of second childhood. It is, he implies, deaf to the call of today and blind to the vision of tomorrow. And dipping into the discarded black bag of Dr. New Deal (retired), he has produced a prescription for Republican rejuvenation.

I am aware that Mr. Willkie would probably protest this description of his medicine. He might point to his many differences with the Administration in regard to foreign policy, to his criticisms of Mr. Roosevelt's administrative techniques, to his own emphasis on the role of private enterprise. It is, of course, a little difficult to define the New Deal with any exactitude. Born in a crisis and developed as a series of improvisations, it was a trend in thinking, an approach to social and political problems, rather than a set program. Whatever its enemies may say, it was never hostile to free enterprise as such. But attempting to enlarge the freedom of the many, it inevitably curtailed some of the freedoms of the few. By protecting the right of workers to combine and contract, it shrank the former liberty of employers to set their own labor standards; by regulating the security exchanges and providing that stockholders be given more information about their own property, it hampered the enterprise of speculators and promoters. Consequently, those whose freedom had been limited attacked the New Deal as the enemy of private business and labeled it as collectivist or even Communist. Mr. Willkie, to judge by these articles, has adopted the New Deal approach. He also is seeking to enlarge the boundaries and opportunities of the many, and by so doing he endangers vested interests. He is thus inviting the same kind of attack from the same quarters that the New Dealers have experienced. I hope he will not let it discourage him.

I can best illustrate the kind of "dangerous thinking" that Mr. Willkie has been indulging in by referring to his proposals for social security and labor. Demolishing the popular conservative argument that security undermines initiative, he declares that we need both. Since a free economy involves risks, these risks, he asserts, should be spread by means of a social-security system that provides universal protection against old age, illness, and unemployment. Criticizing the present law as inequitable and unduly complicated, and going far beyond the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill, he advocates complete medical care, uniform federalized unemployment insurance, and, without using the expression, family allowances. It is not hard to imagine how orthodox Republicans will gag when asked to drink this "Beveridge."

Nor are they likely to swallow cheerfully a proposal that the Republican platform be furnished with a labor plank including an improved wage-and-hour law and repeal of the Smith-Connally Act. Mr. Willkie deplores the fact that the G. O. P. has allowed itself "to be put on the spot on the labor question" by its failure to appreciate that freedom in today's industrial society must include some control by the workers of the circumstances which dictate their means of livelihood. He urges that our post-war economy be built on a high wage level and favors an annual wage for seasonal trades—a proposal greeted with horror in industrial circles when recently put forward by the Steel Workers' Union.

Mr. Willkie's plans for combating post-war depression are less impressive. He recognizes that the demand for full employment cannot be dodged, and cannot be answered "by merely passing resolutions in favor of 'free enterprise.'" But his suggestion that a "cooperative mechanism" in which industry, labor, and government should participate could prove an important factor in ironing out trade cycles must be catalogued under the heading of wishful thinking, unless he is able and willing to reduce it to more concrete terms. Nor do I find very convincing his assertion that the "basic answer to our problems of a demobilization economy . . . lies in our great productive ability." No one denies that, but we have learned by bitter experience that capacity to produce and production are not the same thing. Again, while Mr. Willkie properly denounces monopoly as "the Trojan horse of the free-enterprise system," he leaves us without any definite proposals for disarming the animal. It is only fair, however, to recognize in his very forthright program for tariff reduction one exceedingly effective method of attacking monopolistic prices.

In this instance Mr. Willkie is calling upon the Republicans to turn their backs on a cherished tradition. In his article on the Negro question—perhaps the best in the series—he reminds them of their historical mission in the abolition of slavery. It is strange, he says, that the party should yield year after year to the states'-rights argument against federal protection of Negro rights, and he urges the Chicago convention to "commit itself unequivocally to federal anti-poll-tax and anti-lynching statutes." I shall be surprised if his fellow-Republicans heed this plea. They are interested in retaining states' rights as a weapon against federal economic controls; they are anxious to continue their covert alliance with the reactionary Southern Democrats: these considerations

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are likely to outweigh their need of the Northern Negro vote, which they hope to capture in any case by Democratic default.

The G. O. P. also seems certain to muff the opportunity which Mr. Willkie dangles before it of seizing the internationalist banner half relinquished by Mr. Roosevelt. The Administration, he charges, "has made many protestations of noble aims in foreign policy, but when the moment came to act on them" it has resorted to measures of expediency which have "produced little but dislike, distrust, and loss of prestige for the United States." He therefore calls upon the Republicans to frame "a foreign policy that will recapture America's lost leadership" and to restate our war aims as a fight for freedom, not only at home, but everywhere in the world. Unfortunately, the tendency of most Republicans has been to attack Mr. Roosevelt's international ideals while supporting, openly or tacitly, his practical expedients. Still more than the President, they are haunted by fear of democracy and horror of social revolution. Liberal critics of the Administration's foreign policy can expect no help from this source.

I do not think that Mr. Willkie expects the G. O. P. to swallow this or any other of his proffered aids to rejuvenation. He knows too well that, as a party, it has no desire to recapture its lost youth and go forward to a new age; all it wants is to return to a dead past. What, then, is his purpose in drawing up this progressive program which, released through the major news agencies, has reached millions of citizens? One motive, perhaps, is a desire to provide a yardstick by which the shortcomings of the Chicago platform can be measured. But beyond that, I suspect, Mr. Willkie is anticipating a fluid political situation after the war. The reactionaries have a tight control of the Republican machine; the New Deal grip on the Democratic Party is weakening. Yet inside and outside both organizations there is a huge body of progressive opinion that will seek increasingly to express itself. Mr. Willkie's program could be a bid for the leadership of that politically homeless multitude.

Beachheads for Victory

BY ALFRED VAGTS

POPULAR support for the defense measures adopted before this and the First World War was based chiefly on a widespread anxiety about invasion, especially invasion from overseas. "Well-engineered scares," one of the highest British defense officials once confessed, won funds for armies and navies, for coastal fortifications, and for other assurances against a hostile landing. Most clearly affected were the great maritime powers with their isolationism—literally, islandism. The Monroe Doctrine as a defense policy was deeply rooted in the idea that America, or the Americas, was an island continent menaced by invasion from Europe or Asia. As late as 1898 Bostonians could believe that a Spanish Armada was on its way to attack them.

Yet though the fear of invasion was acute, and often artificially heightened, there was remarkably slight interest in or preparation for amphibious warfare on the part of military or naval men in any country. None of the great military or naval theorists did justice to the subject. Clausewitz had little more to say about landings than that they might be useful diversions and were most apt to succeed when they took place in a province hostile to its own government. Jomini hardly rose above that, perhaps because he was impressed by Napoleon's two great failures—Egypt and Boulogne. Mahan, among the naval writers, was even more crassly one-sided in outlook. About Wolfe at Quebec he said merely that "all his operations were based upon the fleet. . . . The landing which led to the decisive action was made directly from the ships. . . . In a word, the possession of Canada depended upon sea power"—not, apparently, upon soldiers, too, and quite a number of other things. "Decisive" might easily be a word for service egotism. It was the exceptionally good cooperation of the two services that was actually "decisive" at Quebec.

Until the present war teachers of tactics in the various national forces remained almost as little concerned with the potentialities of amphibious undertakings as the theoreticians. For the British the failure at the Dardanelles was the ghastly result. The teachers of the pre-1914 German army, von der Goltz and Balck, considered landings by one great power on another's coast a "chimera" rather than "a serious danger." Later, General von Seeckt, carrying World War experiences over into German post-war schemes, wrote that "America cannot be attacked as far as we are concerned, and until technology has produced new weapons, neither can England. She is more vulnerable in her limbs than in her heart. For that reason we must clear the road to Asia." To a certain extent the bound-by-precedent warnings of such authorities against landings remained influential with the Germans; possibly they kept Hitler from making an attempt against the Festung England when it was weakest, immediately after the fall of its bastion, France.

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During the First World War there were, aside from Gallipoli, only two minor amphibious enterprises—the German capture of the Baltic islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Riga in October, 1917, and the blocking of Zeebrugge by the British in April, 1918. Gallipoli was the concept of civilian war-makers who were unable to break down the narrow specialized attitudes of the services and achieve the tactical cooperation necessary to an amphibious undertaking of such scope; the failure of the attempt acted as a new deterrent to military thinking in that direction.

Total war abrogated the old prohibition, subconscious or not, against amphibious, or three-element, war. Despite German hopes that a decision could be won on land, by tanks at a blitz pace, or at sea by submarines, or, as the adherents of Douhet thought, by air power alone, war could no longer be kept departmentalized. It was not by sea power, by land power, or by air power, but by power of all kinds brought from air and sea to land, that decision could be forced. The Axis powers began to try landings even before 1939, their admirals admitting that "combined operations represent the most effective form of naval warfare" (Admiral Dr. Groos, "Seekriegslehren"). Italy's Abyssinian expedition was an experiment in large-scale military transportation. Troops were landed in Spain from the air. In China the Japanese used for the first time the modern type of landing craft —motor-driven steel barges with unloading facilities.

After the disasters of Dunkirk and Greece, when England evacuated the European continent, and after Pearl Harbor, which forced a withdrawal of the United States from Asia, the problem of landing on hostile shores could no longer be shirked by the political, military, and naval leaders of the United Nations. In a large measure both Germany and Japan were beyond the reach of blockade, and amphibious warfare was thus forced on the Allies (it was also required by the second-front expectations of Soviet Russia). Since they had little or no practical or theoretical preparation for this kind of warfare, the British and Americans had to experiment, using points along the German-controlled Atlantic coast, the Pacific islands, North Africa, Sicily, and Italy as testing grounds and laboratories for the coming D-Day.

The Japanese were perhaps the first to bring army-navy-air cooperation to some degree of perfection, as if to disprove the all too common assumption in the West that conflicts between the rival services are inevitable. Organizational cooperation had been won by the Germans in the second half of the 1930's when they set up a unified over-all command, not merely a constitutional commander-in-chief but a Supreme Command for the three component parts of the armed forces, an *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht,* with an overarching staff for planning, intelligence work, inter-service communications, war economy, public relations, and so on. Such arrangements are imperative not only for the attacker but for the defendant in amphibious warfare; they were wanting at Pearl Harbor on the receiving end.

The essentially new development in modern amphibious warfare is the supplementary landing, made subsequent to the original invasion and in the enemy's rear. Once a front has been established, with one or more wings resting on the sea, the invader, as in Sicily, or the defender, like Russia in the Far North and the Caspian region, may land troops behind the enemy's line. It is now evident that air power has robbed the coastline of importance by being able to fly over it and deposit parachute or glider-borne troops and material at crucial points. This has revolutionized coastal defenses, which was formerly assured by works unprotected in the rear, and has also given immediate depth to fighting on the seashore. While from the nature of their task many of the air-borne troops must be considered "forlorn hopes," one man behind a line of coastal strong points may be worth ten in front of them.

The strategic advantages in landing operations may be with the attacker, but most of the tactical ones are with the defender. These tactical advantages have to be overcome by the most minute planning against contingencies and the gathering of immense quantities of data on such features as tides, depth of coastal waters, weather, and terrain. Of all operations none are more dependent on weather. Luckily, in the present invasion of France the Allies have the advantage of being closer to the regions from which come the "highs" and "lows" that make the weather.

The difficulty of the operation makes it necessary for the invader to employ superior troops, specially equipped and trained and familiar with all the three elements in which they may have to fight or through which they are brought to battle. The troops should also be instructed about the conditions and perhaps the language in the strange country they are invading. As their artillery support may for some time have to come from naval guns or from bombers, communications with which may be hard to maintain, they must be prepared for great independence of action. Thus in its latest developments amphibious warfare calls for extreme specialization in various techniques, such as loading and convoying, for great independence and mobility on the part of individual units, and for the utmost elaboration in timetables and planning, all to be combined under small staffs, with perfect unity of command. Above all, it calls for secrecy.

Every operation of modern war demands surprise—a statement which seems less of a truism if we compare modern combat conditions with the openly drawn-up battle arrays of earlier times—but none more than a landing. Of the three forms of landings, the raid, the diversion, and the full-scale invasion, the first depends most upon

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surprise: it is a hit-and-run affair using tactics similar to those of infantry shock troops, based on minute reconnaissance, and undertaken with small forces to test the enemy's strength, as at Dieppe, or to destroy special installations like the U-boat lairs at St. Nazaire. The diversion is intended to mislead the enemy or tie down his forces and is less dependent on surprise. The full-scale invasion must be prepared to force its way into enemy territory despite resistance; both sea and air supremacy are required for its initial advance and the maintenance of its communications. Only in operations of a restricted nature will supremacy in a single element, air or sea, suffice: in the German conquest of Crete the air-borne invasion was successful while the water-borne attempt was repulsed with heavy losses by the British fleet, which still preserved a remnant of supremacy. In the giant invasion the attacker races with time to land both men and material before the enemy has gathered his strength for the counter-attack.

Contrary to common belief, the first landing is not usually the most difficult thing. The history of invasion by sea shows that at this stage of the enterprise many more landings have been successful than otherwise; in the majority of cases surprise did operate at least at first. Not the reaching of the coast is hard but the maintenance and widening out of the beachhead and its use for victory. The so-called Atlantic Wall of the Germans is of course not an unbroken fortified line co-extensive with the coastline, but blocks of fortifications designed to dominate likely invasion areas by flanking fire and to prevent the use of desirable permanent harbor installations. Whether it will prove a worth-while investment of steel, cement, and human strength for the Germans the next few weeks will show. Psychologically the Atlantic Wall is a high-tension line loaded with the highest possible expectations through that old charging station Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry. A break in its continuity may have enormous consequences. Unlike the slow loss of terrain in trench warfare, the landing of a hostile force in Festung Europa will have repercussions on the German people recalling older popular fears of water-borne invasion. The collapse of Italy when its mere periphery was penetrated shows how powerful is the impact of invasion on the mass imagination—shows that a military reality can be based on an ancient nightmare.



"ELASTIC DEFENCE"

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Nye—a Lost Leader

BY HOWARD G. WILLIAMS

WHEN Gerald P. Nye, senior Senator from North Dakota, goes before the voters in the Republican primary on June 27, he will meet the opposition of the very forces that elected him in each of his previous campaigns. In former days Nye was a progressive leader in a progressive state. The subtle changes that carried him from association with men like Norris and Wagner to the side of Vandenberg and Fish spell one of the tragedies of American politics.

Senator Nye

North Dakota has a great progressive record. Shortly after the last war the Non-Partisan League captured control of the Republican Party, elected the governor and a majority of the legislature, and launched a program of reform. It set up a state bank in which all municipal, county, and state funds are deposited; with these resources it buys its own bonds, saving millions of dollars in interest charges. It organized a state insurance plan; during the depression a loan of $1,000,000 from this fund paid teachers' salaries —at a time when the unpaid teachers of Chicago were storming the office of Charles G. Dawes. The state operates a grain elevator and a flour mill, whose prices encourage operators to keep their own prices within reason. All this has paid well.

It was the Non-Partisan League that first sponsored Gerald P. Nye and that elected him to the Senate in 1926. Time after time it has rallied to his support. Now it is against him. During recent years the League has grown more conservative, and many of its younger farmer members have turned from it to the Farmers' Union and the cooperative movement. But whatever their political and economic divergences, all three groups are now united in their opposition to Nye and in their support of Usher L. Burdick, one of the state's two Representatives.

It is the reactionary, not the liberal, camp that is split in this election. While the main contest is between Nye and Burdick, two other candidates will get some votes. A. C. Townley, one of the founders of the Non-Partisan League, can count on the support of a few old-timers who cling to him out of personal loyalty; but his vote will not be large. Lynn U. Stambaugh, a Fargo attorney and a former national commander of the American Legion, has a good record on international matters but on domestic policies is reactionary and anti-labor. The leaders of the Legion, not the rank and file, are behind him, and he has been receiving substantial aid for an extensive advertising campaign from the business men of Fargo, Grand Forks, and Bismarck. On account of his conservative record, he is likely to steal votes from Nye and not from Burdick. Stambaugh has so far failed to attack Nye's isolationism.

Nye is receiving his main support from the Republican Organizing Committee, the successor to the Independent Voters' Association, which for years has operated as the anti-League wing of the Republican Party. The I. V. A. has always put up a slate of its own and when defeated in the primaries has often joined hands with the Democrats in the elections. The present Democratic governor, John Moses, was elected in this way. Besides backing Nye officially for reelection to the Senate—although many of its members are privately supporting Stambaugh—the Republican Organizing Committee is behind Bill Lemke, a "funny money" man who was Father Coughlin's candidate for President in 1936. His presence on the ticket as a candidate for Congress will be of little help to either Nye or Stambaugh.

Usher L. Burdick has the solid backing of the Non-Partisan League, the Farmers' Union, and the cooperatives. The *Leader*, the League paper, with a circulation of 100,000 in the rural areas, is giving substantial aid, and the League's organizers have been active arranging meetings, forming local committees, and doing house-to-house and store-to-store canvassing. In addition to the support of the League and the farmers' organizations, Burdick has received the indorsement of the North Dakota Federation of Labor, the railroad brotherhoods, and the few local C. I. O. unions. In every city of the state where labor is organized, committees have been formed by union members to help defeat Nye and work for Burdick. There is complete union cooperation—in spite of William Green's indorsement of Nye.

Burdick stands an excellent chance of victory. The people in the state have believed in him from the depression days, when as president of the Farm Holiday Asso-

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ciation he fought an effective battle against mortgage foreclosure and brought pressure on the state and federal governments to relieve the plight of the distressed farmers and workers. People say that in those days only the collections of pennies, nickels, and dimes taken up at his organization meetings kept Burdick himself off relief.

He had been prominent in the public life of the state before then. In 1905 he was graduated in law from the University of Minnesota, where he had been an all-American football player. Three years later, at the age of twenty-nine, he was elected speaker of the state House of Representatives—the youngest man to hold the office. Two years later he became lieutenant governor, again the youngest in the state's history. As a rancher and a breeder of pure-bred cattle and horses he became closely identified with the farmers of the state.

In 1931 Burdick was appointed United States District Attorney. In 1933 he was elected to Congress and has been there ever since. His record on domestic issues has been good. Though a Republican, he has supported the reform program of the New Deal. He helped elect Roosevelt in 1940. He was an isolationist before Pearl Harbor, but his views reflected the sentiment of the state as a whole. Immediately after Pearl Harbor he had the courage to declare publicly that he had been wrong and that henceforth he would support the Administration fully in its conduct of the war. He has kept his pledge.

Before the party conventions Nye did some active campaigning in the state. He attacked the book "Under Cover" and spoke darkly of revealing the Eastern forces which were raising huge sums of money to defeat him. But thus far there have been no revelations. He has taken no part in the campaign in recent weeks; in fact, he has been out of the state. His henchmen have been making use of seven-minute recorded speeches of Senators Wheeler, Vandenberg, Shipstead, Bushfield, and Bridges, which are broadcast on local radio programs throughout the state. They call attention to Nye's nine years of service and point out that he might become chairman of the Appropriations Committee if the Republicans obtain a majority in the Senate.

If Burdick wins the Republican nomination he will face Governor Moses as the Democratic candidate. Moses has no opposition in his own party. He is not a New Dealer, but he is not likely to get many Republican votes. North Dakota Republicans are not in the habit of crossing the party line in an election for national office. On the other hand, thousands of former Democrats have registered as Republicans this year and are supporting Burdick in the primary. It is probable that they will carry on their support into the election.

There is just a possibility that if Nye is not too badly beaten in the primary he may run as an independent in the election. This would complicate matters, but it would hardly affect the outcome.

25 Years Ago in "The Nation"

EVERY DAY MAKES it more clearly evident that we do not even yet know the worst about the "peace treaty" that was handed to the Germans to sign. Not one substantial reason has been given for withholding from the public the full text, which, it is stated, reposes safely in the files of the State Department.—*June 7, 1919.*

THAT THERE IS a measure of revolution behind the Canadian strike situation would now seem to be beyond question. . . . The strike committee in Winnipeg seems to be ruling the town; and since we undoubtedly should have been given the news of any disorders had they occurred, the absence of such news would seem to indicate the same element of self-control there which is the characteristic feature of this general strike everywhere.—*June 7, 1919.*

WOMAN SUFFRAGE through Congress at last; one must rub one's eyes not to believe oneself dreaming. . . . All honor to the women who won the fight, in whatever camp, of whatever faith.—*June 14, 1919.*

A YEAR AGO it looked as if, owing to the economic disarrangements of the conflict, the Negroes would profit much by it. . . . But with the return of the colored soldiers from France and the ending of the war boom, the hopeful note has faded out of the news from the South, and it has taken on a sinister aspect. . . . The Ku Klux have begun to ride again. On a single morning recently they burned in Putnam County, Georgia, five Negro churches, two schools, and a lodge hall.—*June 14, 1919.*

WASHINGTON, JUNE 7—The sensation of the week in the capital—namely, the disclosure in the Senate that copies of the peace treaty are in the hands of financial interests in New York—has been at once amusing, discouraging, and alarming. . . . How does it happen that such a scandalous accusation can pass unchallenged—that it unquestionably is true? How did financial interests get advance copies of the treaty? . . . How deeply involved are they in the negotiations at Paris? What are they planning to do with the world?—LINCOLN COLCORD, *June 14, 1919.*

PARIS, MAY 30—There is no new spirit at Paris. The same Big Four who have dominated the situation thus far still dominate it, and the forces upon which they rely for support are still solidly behind them. There is among them no more of generosity or of genuine regard for the people than there has been all along, and the only concessions will be such as may be deemed expedient, not to right essential wrongs, but to prevent too open a manifestation of discontent.—WILLIAM MACDONALD, *June 21, 1919.*

THE FALL OF ORLANDO marks the beginning of the disappearance of the Big Five who have done such mischief to the world in Paris. The next to go will probably be Clemenceau. . . . No one can even guess whether there will be a revolution, and if so when it will come.—*June 28, 1919.*

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Tory Eyes on Quebec

BY EDMOND TURCOTTE

AS GOES Maine, so goes the nation; as goes Quebec, so goes Canada. But in the latter case the barometer has to be read with colored glasses and a logarithmic table. Quebec is not a sign of Canadian trends, nor does it start them; it checks and sometimes guides them by throwing its weight one way or the other.

The French-speaking province is always something of an enigma to the rest of the country. With language differences acting as a barrier to understanding, distorted or erroneous notions circulate widely in English-speaking Canada, and Quebec is both disliked and feared—besides being courted by all parties.

This is election year in the Old Province. All eyes in Canada are turned toward it. What panel of men and what set of ideas will Quebec support? Will it favor the nation-wide Liberal Party and vote for Mackenzie King and "national unity" at Ottawa, and for Adélard Godbout, Liberal reform, and a full war effort at Quebec? Or will it back Maurice Duplessis, the province's anti-war leader who engineered a regrouping of demagogic conservative forces in 1935 under the name of Union Nationale, captured the government in August, 1936, and went down to ignominious defeat in October, 1939? Or can it be that French Canada will turn to the Bloc Populaire Canadien, a parafascist movement launched in October, 1942, along much the same lines as Pétain's Vichy government? Even the Empire Loyalist Tories, led since December, 1942, by John Bracken, a progressive farmer who for twenty years was Prime Minister of Manitoba, seem to think that a profitable alliance can be made in Quebec this year—with the anti-loyalist Union Nationale!

The Bloc Populaire Canadien is a crystallization of various isolationist, anti-British, socially reactionary, pro-fascist, and nationalist trends in French Canada. It is a greater threat to the Union Nationale than to the Liberal Party because it carries the Union Nationale's demagoguery several steps farther. Launched by the Liberal members of the Ottawa House of Commons who opposed their own party on all war issues, the Bloc is led by the austere and single-minded Maxime Raymond. Its rank-and-file support in the Old Province is based chiefly on the ever-present and never-successful nationalist sentiment. The Bloc is rent by personal jealousies and factional bickerings over petty dogma. For that reason it is not a great political force, but it is a disturbing factor of considerable importance.

The C. C. F. (Cooperative Commonwealth Federation) has made astounding gains in Ontario and the Western Provinces and has become a dangerous rival of the orthodox parties, but its progress is extremely slow in French Canada because the church still frowns on any hint of socialism. Indeed, if French Canadians are ever headstrong enough to ignore the taboos of their church with regard to socialism, they will as likely as not go to the extreme of traveling with the Communists, now the Labor Progressives. Neither the C. C. F. nor the Labor Progesssives are at present a political factor of real weight in Quebec. Socialism is exerting a very subtle influence on French Canadian ideas but not on Quebec practical politics.

Last but not least as a locally important figure is Camillien Houde, stormy petrel of Quebec politics, once provincial leader of the Conservative Party and many times Mayor of Montreal. Houde was interned in July, 1940, under Defense of Canada Regulations because he publicly advised the people against compliance with the war-time National Registration Act. He is a powerful mob orator and has a fanatical following in Montreal working-class quarters, but no one knows which way he will turn when he secures his freedom, which he is likely to do before election day. The deciding factor may be his undying personal feud with Maurice Duplessis.

A natural line of cleavage between progressive and reactionary forces has developed in Quebec as a result of the terrific blow struck at the power trust by Premier Godbout. Legislation to socialize Montreal Light, Heat, and Power Consolidated, a $70,000,000 corporation, was introduced on March 22 in the Legislative Assembly at Quebec. Three weeks later full possession of all the company's properties required for the generation and distribution of gas and electricity, wholesale and retail, was taken by the newly created Quebec Hydroelectric Commission, known as Hydro-Quebec.

From the partisan political angle it is significant that this government move was opposed at every step, in both houses of the legislature, by the Union Nationale and its leader, Maurice Duplessis, although in the critical election years of 1935 and 1936 the overthrow of Premier Taschereau's long-lived Liberal regime had been brought about partly by the inflammatory speeches of Duplessis and his followers against the power trust. Since that time it has been revealed by Duplessis's quondam ally, Edouard Lacroix, a big lumberman with pulp interests in Maine as well as in southern Quebec, that agents of the power trust contributed $150,000 to the

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Union Nationale's campaign funds at the very time Duplessis was inveighing against Montreal Power. Lacroix's revelation, never openly denied by Duplessis, would explain why the latter, when he became Premier, evaded execution of his campaign promises to destroy the power trust. Instead, he undertook to build in the remote and sparsely inhabited mining district of Temiskaming, in the Far North, a so-called yardstick power plant which operated actually for the exclusive benefit of Noranda Mines, one of the big Canadian mining corporations. Even the Tory Montreal *Gazette* has described this project as "excessively costly and uneconomic."

The socialization of Montreal Light, Heat, and Power brings to a climax one phase of the people's struggle against what French Canadians call *la dictature économique*. This struggle began over a century ago against an oligarchy of English colonial administrators and big landholders known as the Family Compact; in our generation it has taken the form of a fight against *les trusts*, with the power trust the symbol of all the others.

The anti-trust upsurge in French Canada is powerfully reinforced by racial and cultural antagonisms. Big business all over North America speaks English, which gives "economic dictatorship" an added odium in the eyes of the average French Canadian. Even T. D. Bouchard, the first president of Hydro-Quebec and long a tenacious and very practical leader in Quebec's fight against the power trust, based part of his strategy on the people's desire to shake off "foreign "domination, though he has been himself a life-long critic of narrow French Canadian nationalism.

A traditional reform Liberal, Bouchard has long been regarded as a dangerous radical by fellow Quebec Liberals, most of whom succumbed to the dry rot of conservatism after the Laurier era. Undeterred by their defection, the short, burly, and square-shouldered Bouchard, a visible symbol of physical and moral strength, carried on the fight for his reforms, one of which was the creation of a socialized hydroelectric system like that in the neighboring province of Ontario.

Bouchard brought together the various currents of opposition to the power trust, and finally, in 1934, the Liberal Premier of Quebec, aristocratic Alexandre Taschereau, yielding to popular clamor, appointed a commission of three, presided over by French Canada's elder statesman Ernest Lapointe, to make a thorough study of the question. Bouchard appeared before the commission with facts and arguments completely mobilized for the assault. He spoke for eighteen hours in all. And he was so effective that a high official of Montreal Power called him aside during a recess and made this diplomatic approach: "Splendid! Do you know how much a man of your ability would be worth to us? Half a million dollars!" Bouchard smiled incredulously and shook his head. Montreal Power's diplomatic agent tried again: "No? Well, maybe one million dollars." The matter went no farther. *Honi soit qui mal y pense!*

When Taschereau admitted Bouchard to his Cabinet in 1935, it was too late. The forty-year-old Liberal regime was tottering with the ills of nepotism, sluggishness, and old age. Duplessis and his Union Nationale made reckless accusations of fraud, embezzlement, and outright theft, not a single one of which Duplessis could prove after he became Premier and Attorney General. The Liberal regime, however, had permitted itself the usual carelessness with public funds, and this gave verisimilitude to the cry of "scandal." In the summer of 1936 Maurice Duplessis's motley Union Nationale took power, riding the crest of a popular wave against *les trusts*. But in October, 1939, Duplessis in turn had to yield to a revamped Liberal Party under the progressive leadership of Adélard Godbout and T. D. Bouchard.

Godbout, prudent but resolute, slowly built around Montreal Power a subtle ring of Public Service Board inquiries and then suddenly sprang the dramatic announcement that a bill to socialize the corporation would be introduced at the spring session of 1944. An intensive campaign in defense of Montreal Power was immediately launched in the Tory and financial press, over the radio, and in boards of trade. The case was linked with the preservation of free enterprise. Every device of propaganda and press relationship was used. But Godbout was adamant. The act to establish the Quebec Hydro-electric Commission was given royal assent, and on April 15 the new government-created body took possession of Montreal Power and of its subsidiary, Beauharnois Light, Heat, and Power, a large generating development astride the Canada–United States hydroelectric and canalization projects on the St. Lawrence above Montreal.

The immense significance of the power policy inaugurated by the Godbout government is better understood when one knows that Quebec, with countless streams and waterfalls, possesses 50 per cent of Canada's hydroelectric developments, and that Montreal Power was by far the largest power company in Quebec.

In the act creating Hydro-Quebec no amount was set as compensation for the expropriated assets. The act stipulates in essence that the indemnity eventually to be paid shall be the capital sum which the Public Service Board recognizes as legitimate for the fixing of rates. Throughout the debate Montreal Power has maneuvered to be expropriated, if matters came to the worst, at its own estimation of its overcapitalized value—$114,000,000—as against the figure of $70,000,000 arrived at by the Public Service Board.

In a letter of February 7, 1944, to Montreal Power's chief counsel, Aimé Geoffrion, Premier Godbout quoted Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court to the effect that "the value of the going enterprise depends

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on earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated." Spokesmen for Godbout in the Liberal press also made use of the United States Federal Power Commission's order of November 8, 1943, to the Public Service Electric and Gas Company of New Jersey, requiring it to show cause why its plant accounts should not be reduced by $67,893,000.

Premier Godbout's term of office is running out. He will have to call elections before the snow flies. If he were to be judged solely by his policies, he would again sweep the province. His creation of Hydro-Quebec is only one of many progressive accomplishments of, for Quebec, an almost revolutionary character. But the Union Nationale and the Bloc Populaire will make the most of surviving isolationist sentiment in French Canada and of the war fatigue.

When war broke out and Canada entered the struggle at Great Britain's side in September, 1939, Premier Duplessis, whose government was in dire financial straits, made an issue of Canada's participation in a war for "foreign" interests. He was roundly repudiated at the polls, his party obtaining only sixteen out of eighty-six seats. His English-speaking Tory followers in Montreal and elsewhere turned against him in droves. Loyalty to the British tie has always run high among them, and in the fall of 1939 it was a stronger bond than Conservative Party fealty.

Now that the United Nations have passed the crest of military preparation and that victory appears to be only a matter of time, the henchmen of big business, grouped in the Progressive Conservative Party—a December, 1942, label for a very old Tory bottle—are willing to pass over the memory of their hurt British loyalties. They think they can safely risk a new horse trade with the unsavory Duplessis ("he's so un-British, you know!") for the sake of free enterprise and political success in the national field—no political party can hope to gain power in Ottawa, save by a miracle, unless it can rely on at least substantial minority support from Quebec, where about 30 per cent of Canada's population lives.

If a combination of Tories and the Union Nationale should win in Quebec, there would be dark days ahead for Canada during the aftermath of the war, for Quebec looms large in the Canadian picture. At this writing, however, uneasiness is fast receding. The legislature has made a $10,000,000 provision for rural electrification, and Hydro-Quebec has announced general rate reductions of $2,210,000—an average of 19 per cent for domestic consumers—and a $300,000 salary increase for its employees. The Godbout Liberals are again enjoying a high tide of popularity, and it does not seem that French-speaking Canadians will play, even unwittingly, the Tory hand.

In the Wind

TRUSTWORTHY FREE FRENCH SOURCES reveal that Léon Blum is in prison in southern Germany, with his wife. His health, it is reported, is good, his morale excellent, although he is permitted little intellectual activity or social intercourse. He is allowed to see only Georges Mandel and Mme Mandel, who are in the same prison. He may send two letters a month to his son, a prisoner of war elsewhere in Germany, but may correspond with no one else. No word has been received in Algiers concerning Léon Jouhoux, who is believed to be in a German prison for Aryans, along with Reynaud and Gamelin.

WASHINGTON ADAMS, Washington correspondent of Leon de Aryan's *Broom*, suggests a constitutional amendment which would provide, among other things, that "no person may become President who has within five years previous to appointment or election been a resident or citizen of New York City, or resided within one hundred miles of said city's incorporate (*sic*) limits."

THE *X-RAY*, ANOTHER SHEET with fascist sympathies, has this to say about public education: "One wonders if the old-time private school is about to reappear. We could, in such schools, keep out the red rat, communistic doctrines, and English propaganda from contaminating the minds of the children." And no doubt English grammar too.

FROM A LAUDATORY REVIEW of Eric Johnston's "America Unlimited" by Henry M. Wriston: "Though he went through a university and a professional school, he mentions no single teacher, and the only books given much attention are those of Horatio Alger."

THE MOST REFRESHING political comment we have seen in a long time is this letter to the editor of the New York *Daily News*: "You Newsites are all a bunch of rotten Dodgerites, and the only reason I buy your filthy rag is for the sports, features, and comic strips, the funniest by far being that daily editorial smear of F. D. R. After it's all over, you can crawl back into your holes, together with other Dodger derelicts. Hail to the Giants, and long live Mel Ott!"

FESTUNG EUROPA: Berlin's domestic radio recently offered its listeners a lecture on the biological and psychological causes of gooseflesh. . . . The social-minded Danish underground movement is endeavoring to provide the blind with underground newspapers and pamphlets. Recently, patriots invaded a Copenhagen printing house for the blind, occupying it for several hours and "forcing" the staff to print a considerable amount of material in Braille.

[*We invite our readers to submit material for In the Wind —either clippings with source and date or stories that can be clearly authenticated. A prize of $5 will be awarded each month for the best item.*—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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Recovery in Russia

BY FRITZ STERNBERG

RECONSTRUCTION is the first item on Russia's agenda after the war, and there is reason to believe that we shall see an industrial miracle comparable to the military miracle we have already witnessed in that country.

Russia's victories have not been cheaply bought. No other country has suffered such terrible wounds. In addition to its military losses, which have been the largest in the war thus far, it has lost millions of civilians to the barbarism of the German occupation authorities; and the destruction of its industries and agriculture has been greater than that in any other country the Nazis have visited.

Modern war is industrial war. The Russians have understood this from the beginning. Ever since June 22, 1941, the day the Nazi armies marched into Russia without a declaration of war, the Soviet authorities have acted in the knowledge that every factory, every machine, that fell into the enemy's hands would increase his military strength. Their scorched-earth policy consisted of two kinds of measures: (1) the evacuation of industries and all qualified workers from the regions immediately threatened by the Nazis, and (2) where evacuation was impossible for technical reasons, as in the case of the dam at Dniepropetrovsk and of coal mines everywhere, the destruction of everything that could help the enemy either directly or indirectly. The Germans restored some of these industries, but when they withdrew they tried to leave nothing behind them. They destroyed not only factories and machinery but houses and buildings of all kinds. In some cases their retreat was so rapid that they had no time for complete destruction, but according to the Moscow correspondent of the New York *Times*, "not a single enterprise in South Russia's iron and steel industry has escaped damage. . . . To cripple the area where before the war two-thirds of Russia's iron and steel industry was situated, the Germans created a special demolition school in a Donbas city. . . . Winding machinery and cranes at the mines were cut so thoroughly with oxygen torches that their rebuilding is judged impossible."

In some Russian provinces which changed hands several times in the course of the fighting the decline in production is estimated at 75 per cent; in many others it exceeds 50 per cent. Of course this does not mean that the total Russian production has declined by 50 per cent. The Russians evacuated a considerable portion of their industries, and they have vastly expanded their production in the eastern regions and in Soviet Asia. Taking all these factors into consideration, it may be estimated that even in the most difficult months of the war Russian production did not fall below 50 per cent of the prewar total. Today it has risen probably to two-thirds of that figure, if not higher.

The work of reconstruction is already under way in the midst of war. In order to take the offensive, for example, the Russians were forced to repair their transportation equipment. Naturally, only the most urgent repairs could be made, but the rapid advance of the Soviet armies in recent months shows that by and large they succeeded in putting the Russian rail network back into working order. A large proportion of the arms factories in the newly retaken territory are already producing again. But these feats could be accomplished only because Russian civilians made the severest personal sacrifices. Living standards continue to be extraordinarily low.

One gets a certain insight into the present low level of Russian consumption, and its probable level throughout 1944, from the budget report of M. Zverev, Commissar of Finance, to the most recent joint session of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet. This report is the first official statement on war finances which has been published in Russia since the beginning of the war. One of the most important sources of revenue is the turnover tax, applied at the point of production on all manufactured articles. In 1941 this tax brought into the public coffers 124,500,000,000 rubles; in 1944 it will bring in only 80,200,000,000, despite the fact that the rate has been doubled since 1941. The London *Economist* comments thus on the budget:

> If the revenue from the turnover tax is taken as a rough index of consumption in Russia—and it is a pretty accurate index for consumption in the towns—then the conclusion seems to be that in 1943 about two-thirds of Russia's normal population consumed only one-third of the total quantity of goods consumed in Russia immediately before the war. Consumption during the war appears to have been halved—and the comparison is with 1940, a year of relative underconsumption.

Russian agriculture has suffered especially heavy losses. The Nazis looted most of the collective farms, slaughtered much of the livestock, carried off tractors and other machinery, and burned provisions which they could not

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Salute to Russia

In three years of epic struggle Soviet Russia has astonished everyone: not only by the heroism of its armies but by the strategic genius of its generals; not only by the iron determination of Stalingrad to withstand the assault but by the swift rebuilding of the city as soon as the siege was lifted; not only by Russian audacity in attack but by Russian ingenuity in laying, in the midst of war, the basis of reconstruction. On the third anniversary of the Soviet Union's entry into the war we hail its accomplishments in a spirit of deepest admiration for the world's great proletarian state.

take along when they retreated. It is true that the Russians had evacuated much of their cattle and farm machinery and are now bringing them back; but Russian resources, already overtaxed for war purposes, simply cannot fill all needs at once. The meager extent to which the returned animals will meet the needs of the liberated areas can be judged by the following table, which shows the present animal population of certain provinces as a percentage of the pre-war figure. It was compiled by the London *Economist* on the basis of official Russian statements:

Province	*Horned Cattle*	*Sheep and Goats*	*Horses*
Kalinin	3.5	2.5	2.0
Smolensk	6.0	3.0	2.0
Kursk	0.3	0.9	0.3
Orel	2.5	5.0	2.0
Rostov	5.0	10.0	8.5
Stalingrad	1.5	3.0	1.0

The figures we have today are not and need not be final; but even if they should double they would still show with cruel clarity the terrible decline in Soviet agricultural production and indicate the difficulty of reconstruction.

While the war is on, the Russians are rebuilding only what is absolutely necessary, but plans are already in the making for the complete reconstruction of Soviet industry and agriculture. The outlook in this respect is much better than it was at the end of World War I. At that time the civil war and the general disorganization of the country made it impossible to start the actual work of rebuilding until 1921, but now the Russians are beginning the work before the end of the war. Moreover, today they have millions of skilled workers; their technical advance from 1921 to 1941 was unmatched by any other country in the world. And there is one other factor: after the last war they financed the rebuilding chiefly with their own funds; this time there will be considerable assistance from other countries.

After the war it is probable that the United States and Britain will occupy the western half of Germany and Russia the eastern half. Thus far the eastern half has been bombed least of all, its production is far above peace-time levels, and even after the war there will probably be a great deal of industrial activity there. Thus it is not too optimistic to assume that the Russians will be able to use at least part of the industry of eastern Germany to repair some of the havoc wrought by the German armies. And there are indications that the United States will help substantially with supplies.

What Russia needs primarily is capital goods to set its industrial system in motion again—locomotives, railroad cars, machines, machine tools, electrical apparatus, motors, tractors. It is in this field that American productive capacity, which, as we know, has grown more rapidly during this war than at any other period in the country's history, shows the most striking increase. Production today is 50 per cent greater than it was in 1940, the best year before the war. If after the war American production declines to the level of 1940 there will be unprecedented unemployment. The Department of Commerce study, "Markets After the War," analyzes the situation as follows:

> It seems almost certain that post-war output must exceed the best pre-war year. If it should be no more than in 1940 there would be the nine million who were unemployed in 1940, plus the two and a half million added to the civilian labor force between 1940 and 1946, plus eight million who would be replaced by improvements in efficiency over the six years, a total of over nineteen million unemployed. Even with an average work week five hours shorter than in 1940 there would be more unemployed than the thirteen million in 1932.

If large-scale unemployment is to be prevented after the war, expansion of foreign trade is essential. In this connection a statement by W. Averell Harriman, American ambassador to Russia, is noteworthy. The New York *Times* quotes Harriman to the effect that "he and other members of the American embassy staff planned to give the greatest possible consideration immediately to the assistance the United States can give the Soviet Union in the rehabilitation of devastated areas and the repairing of other war-caused dislocations." Certainly the Soviet Union will offer a big market for American manufactured products. Harry Hopkins has estimated that American exports to Russia will amount to some $750,000,000 annually.

Taking all factors into consideration—Russia's technical progress, its millions of skilled workers, the contribution German industry may have to make, and the probable assistance of the United States—one can conclude that after this war Russia's reconstruction will be much more rapid than it was after World War I.

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Behind the Enemy Line

BY ARGUS

AFTER a few years we shall know in what respects the German army command was surprised by the invasion. The publicity and propaganda officials were certainly thoroughly prepared for it. The civil and military authorities of the Reich must have agreed on their line weeks before H-hour.

About purely military events they must have decided to give out swift, accurate, and fairly detailed news. The early Allied communiqués were intentionally laconic and indefinite, but the Germans gave many details and names. In fact, at first German announcements almost filled the American press, and they were proved later to have been in large part correct. It is clear that in the matter of military news the Germans had resolved to establish a reputation for trustworthiness both among their own people and abroad.

The way the events announced were colored and interpreted is another story. From the very first the German domestic radio was flooded with commentaries and speeches sounding a hundred variations on a few themes and apparently in large part written beforehand. Prominent among these was the assurance that the High Command had not "allowed itself to be surprised at any point." Everything had been exactly foreseen and even publicly predicted—including the fact that the Allies would win a few narrow beachheads. This possibility, indeed, was very prudently emphasized by German propaganda for some weeks before the invasion.

Another favorite theme, incessantly repeated, was that "the Anglo-Americans are not acting on their own initiative in attacking Europe; they are merely carrying out Stalin's orders"—a distinction which must have elicited from Germans mentally the German equivalent of "And so what?" One note that was harped on constantly was a reference to "Europe's" enthusiastic solidarity before the attack of non-Europeans. Even the French were represented as furiously hostile to the invaders. The Wilhelmstrasse spokesman, Dr. Schmidt, in his first press conference went so far as to say that when Allied prisoners were marched through French cities they "were scoffed at and mocked by the population."

But the principal theme was and is: Fortunately our waiting is now at an end and the war is at last nearing a decision. "The hour has come," said the ace radio commentator Hans Fritzsche, "for which the German command, the German soldier, and the German people have prayed, for which they have long prepared, for which they have worked, suffered, and fought." This time, "in repulsing the last danger threatening us we shall secure once and for all our freedom and our right to live." And why is this the "phase of decision"? Is it because Germany has lost the war if the Allies win this phase? Quite the contrary—it is because the Allies have lost the war if they do not win this phase. That is the center of gravity of the whole German propaganda effort. By every means at its disposal, by mysticism and mystification, it is trying to engender in the public the feeling that not the Third Reich but England and the United States are playing their last card on the northern coast of France. If during the coming weeks the invasion is stopped at the coast, German propaganda reiterates, the Anglo-Americans will be incapable of making another move. They will be through, beaten to their knees, and the Reich will have its foot on their neck.

All neutral correspondents still in Germany describe the repressed excitement of the people. "As one walks through the streets one gets the impression that the war has just begun. The man in the street has the most intense interest in every detail of the great landing operations; he discusses and judges them expertly. Every radio broadcast is listened to; every newspaper is snatched from the vender's hands." "In Berlin the people form small groups at street corners and in restaurants and discuss the news." But while the correspondent of the Stockholm *Aftonbladet* gained the impression that the reaction of the German home front to the landings could "best be described as solemn," it seemed considerably more prosaic to his colleague on the *Nya Daglight Allehanda.* "The question most discussed," he said, "is whether with the Allied forces so occupied in the west the home front may not be spared further bombings."

Spain and the Invasion

NOWHERE did German propaganda about the impregnable Atlantic Wall find a more trusting audience than in Madrid. The invasion has therefore been a terrible blow. The Phalangist press and radio are obliged to acknowledge Allied advances, but they cannot hide their impatience for the expected German counter-attack. They place all their hopes in the ability of the German High Command to drive the Anglo-American forces back into the sea.

Twice in public, when addressing the officers of the Spanish army, Franco has developed his theories of the war. In private conversations he has been even more outspoken about the role he would like eventually to play. He sees himself, together with the Vatican, as the chief agent for a negotiated peace. Since the end of 1943 he has hoped that the Germans would halt the Soviet armies at a safe distance from the East Prussian frontier, at whatever sacrifice of troops, and then launch a tremendous counter-offensive in the west which would cost the Allies dearly in men and material. In other words, he has counted upon a stalemate, which would mean the reestablishment of Germany's defensive position and the creation of propitious circumstances for a negotiated peace. Every new Allied thrust into Normandy stabs at his heart.

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BOOKS and the ARTS

Vanity, Justice, and Falstaff

THE FORTUNES OF FALSTAFF. By J. Dover Wilson. The Macmillan Company. $2.25.

DOVER WILSON'S latest book, "The Fortunes of Falstaff," is worthy of its subject. It is his most entertaining venture. By now everyone realizes that Wilson is a creative artist, a critic who regards a drama of Shakespeare's as material for the free play of his imagination. Fortunately such liberties as he takes with the plain facts are never expressions of subjectivism run rampant. Nor are they products of "pure" aesthetic criticism, like that which pours from the transcendental mind of Wilson Knight. Dover Wilson conscientiously tries to base his interpretation upon a careful reading of the text and to submit his conjectures to scholarly discipline. Yet he must be followed warily, for he is at his ingratiating best when taking the most precarious positions.

It should be said that he begins his study impeccably. He rejects with some scorn the Falstaff myth born in the eighteenth century and given wide currency by the late A. C. Bradley. This interpretation assumes that Shakespeare's plans for the treatment of his comic hero miscarried. According to Bradley, the dramatist intended that Prince Hal's rejection of Sir John should serve as triumphant proof of the young man's reform. But he unwittingly made Falstaff so captivating a fellow that almost everyone today regards his final banishment as the heartless deed of a calculating politician. This view Wilson brands as pure sentimentalism. Yet he has no more sympathy with Stoll's "realistic" notion that Falstaff is nothing more than a familiar Plautine braggart. To mediate between Bradley and Stoll, Wilson tries to take Dr. Johnson's sturdy common-sense view of Falstaff.

However, Wilson at the outset of his journey makes a characteristically precise conjecture that should prepare us for his new interpretation. Shakespeare, he supposes, intended the second part of "Henry IV" to follow the first part "by not more than twenty-four hours." So he assumes that Shakespeare from the first planned the two plays as a carefully unified and integrated single drama. They were to form a glorified morality play presenting an irrepressible conflict between Government and Vanity. In Part I, Wilson goes on to say, Prince Hal, representing Chivalry or Prowess in the field, triumphs over Riot, impersonated by Falstaff; in Part II Justice is victor over a still lower form of Profligacy. Most critics have long been agreed that the two "Henry IV" dramas form a rough equivalent of a typical prodigal-son play and that one of Falstaff's many forbears was the joyous tippler who haunted the tavern where the prodigal son wasted his substance. But few possess an active enough imagination to discern in the merry saga of Falstaff and the Prince traces of a stiff morality pattern.

This hypothesis does not prevent Wilson from taking honest delight in Falstaff's early triumphs. He easily disposes of the foolish question of Falstaff's cowardice. Shakespeare made him a coward in action only that the heroism of his wit might shine the brighter. For in the realm of wit, Wilson says, Falstaff is no coward; his impudence is a form of daring. But our critic surely exaggerates the speed of Falstaff's mind when he imagines that from the first moment of his meeting with the Prince and Poins after the Gadshill robbery he divines that these two were his assailants. Since Shakespeare's lines do not make this clear, Wilson is certain that the actor playing the part did so by sundry winks and nods to the audience, the meaning of which the intelligent spectators easily caught. The scene is thus reduced to a private joke between the actor and a few cleverlings in his audience. These favored few would lose all the swift surprise of Falstaff's witty escape from the Prince's trap: "Was it for me to kill the heir-apparent?" "I was now a coward on instinct."

The Falstaff of Part II suffers a strange metamorphosis at Wilson's hands largely because the critic makes the extraordinary assumption that all England believes the Prince's tale that it was Sir John who slew Douglas. This fiction has gained the rogue a "European reputation" for bravery, an imposture that works like wine in his brain. Finding his old role of "mock-maudlin highwayman" beneath his new dignity, he now blossoms out into a "complete courtier," "the preposterous, self-satisfied pink of gentility."

To make this conception plausible, Wilson tries not to laugh much at any of Falstaff's doings in Part II. He finds, for example, little to amuse him in Sir John's two interviews with the Chief Justice. He sees in them only Shakespeare's purpose to show how absurdly inept Vanity appears when she attempts to fence with Justice. But a reader ridden by no such theory rejoices in these absurd encounters. Falstaff's success in thawing the Justice's severity into mirth is proof sufficient that Sir John has lost none of his ability to drown gravity in laughter. Wilson is also resolutely not amused at Falstaff's "overreaching of Shallow," insisting that Shakespeare expected us to regard this episode with only "tolerant amusement."

Now it is undoubtedly true that Shakespeare made some effort to win approval for the Prince's rejection of his disreputable companion. By presenting in the early scenes of the second part of "Henry IV" a Falstaff who is morally debased, the dramatist weans us from our affection for the rascal. Sir John is sent to Boar's Head Tavern, not as of old to give his wit a holiday, but to fondle the foul-mouthed whore Doll Tearsheet. Such conduct is calculated to make the rogue sink low in our esteem. But when Falstaff meets Justice Shallow he again devises matter "to keep the world in continued laughter." Then we realize that our aesthetic delight in him is as strong as ever. Thus to the very end of his double drama Shakespeare holds the artistic balance so evenly between Falstaff and the Prince that the rascal's vices never affect us like actual evil-doing. To turn from them with moral aversion is deliberately to close our eyes to Falstaff's continuing charm and to twist Shakespeare's artistic pattern completely out of shape.

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But it is ungracious to dwell on the blemishes of Dover Wilson's brilliant volume. Only when his craving for critical adventure carries him beyond the reach of Shakespeare's text is he dangerous to follow. Most of the time he sends us back to the plays with renewed curiosity and with an enriched understanding of the Fortunes of Falstaff.

OSCAR JAMES CAMPBELL

War in the Sky

WAR BELOW ZERO: THE BATTLE FOR GREENLAND. By Colonel Bernt Balchen, Major Corey Ford, and Major Oliver La Farge. Houghton Mifflin Company. $2.

OUR HIDDEN FRONT. By William Gilman. Reynal and Hitchcock. $3.

G—FOR GENEVIEVE. By Lieutenant J. M. Herbert. Roy Publishers. $2.50.

THIS business of making war in the sky has so many facets that there are innumerable good tales to be told, given a reasonable amount of imagination in the telling. In "War Below Zero" we have the cooperation of two expert story-tellers, Oliver La Farge and Corey Ford, who include in their team one of the most admirable of the pioneer fliers, Bernt Balchen, commander of the Greenland army air base. Major La Farge is historical officer of the Air Transport Command; his job is to assemble the full chronicle of the A. T. C., much of which must be kept secret until after the war. Major Ford is assigned by the army to write about flying men. Colonel Balchen is the large, calm man who has looked down on more ice than any other air pilot in the world. The three of them came together in Greenland, fascinated by this weird land of frozen death which suddenly became one of the vital junctions of modern North Atlantic travel.

In Greenland the horizon frequently is erased by the blending of snow and sky, so that an experienced flier may make a perfect landing—fifty feet up in the air; or may make a landing involuntarily when he thinks he is flying. The latter happened to a Flying Fortress being ferried over the ice cap on November 9, 1942. It was not until five months later that eight men finally were rescued; meanwhile three of their rescuers had been killed. Major La Farge tells about The Long Wait in the sixty-three-page middle section of the book, and surely this must rank among the classic stories of the Far North in the aviation age.

Having so many authors makes "War Below Zero," like the Greenland ice cap, choppy. Nevertheless, one gets the feel of this land where "a deep breath will shrivel your lungs" and where the heroism of men like Balchen has kept open the ferry route to England against incredible odds.

The fliers fighting the Japanese in the Aleutians were not so near the top of the world, but they were near enough so that they, too, learned how to roast a plane's motor to make it fly after being out in a fifty-below-zero blizzard. Their main problem, described in "Our Hidden Front," was the unnatural combination of blinding fog and the eighty-mile-an-hour williwaw wind. The bomber pilots complained that the clouds had too many rocks in them; but they said it wasn't so bad as long as the pilot still could see the co-pilot.

Mr. Gilman devotes only part of his book to fliers, for he is concerned primarily with writing as much of the history as can now be disclosed of the Alaska-Aleutian campaign. He blames our armed forces for having been inexcusably unprepared for war in that area—so much so that the Japanese could have walked right through Alaska into Canada at the beginning; he even suggests that the army for a time expected to lose Alaska. Mr. Gilman was the first newspaper correspondent to reach Alaska after Pearl Harbor, and he stayed there the longest of any, two winters, devoting a goodly portion of his energies to battling a censorship that made Singapore look like an open forum. Perhaps he is too enthusiastic in accepting Billy Mitchell's thesis that America could dominate the world by air power based on Alaska. Even if we don't want to dominate the world, however, the development of short-line global transportation across the Arctic by way of Alaska and Greenland may turn out to be one of the most significant achievements of these war years.

"G—for Genevieve," a thoroughly beguiling book, should be read for entertainment rather than for information. The author, who writes under a pseudonym, was an ancient (last war) Polish fighter pilot who fled to internment in Rumania, then sneaked out to France hoping to kill Germans, then went to England for the same purpose, and finally wangled a highly unsafe job as a rear gunner in a night

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bomber, Genevieve, which was manned and serviced by Poles, all bent on killing Germans.

Lieutenant Herbert yields to none in his pride in being a Pole, but he looks at his countrymen with loving amusement. They feel that there is no race of man that can equal Poles. The Rumanians were unspeakably dumb and disorderly. Didn't they allow thousands of Poles to outwit them and escape to freedom, thanks largely to the ingenuity of the author and his fabulous ex-chauffeur, Pryszcyck? As for the French, Lieutenant Herbert speaks of them "without anger and without pain, rather with a sense of compassion." The English were not so bad, except for their lack of imagination, their need of enlivenment, and the fact that their island wasn't situated in Poland. Reading this book, one begins to think the Polish braggadocio has a certain justification in fact, not to mention a rich background of humor.

MARCUS DUFFIELD

Grand Old Man of Impressionism

CAMILLE PISSARRO: LETTERS TO HIS SON LUCIEN. Edited by John Rewald with the Assistance of Lucien Pissarro. Translated from the French by Lionel Abel. Pantheon Books. $6.50.

PISSARRO wrote to his son Lucien in 1896: "We are on the right track, be faithful to your sensations." During the twenty years (1883 to 1903) covered by these hundreds of letters the old painter changed his mind more than once. But to "nature" and his "sensations" he remained true from first to last. His shifts of attitude in other respects came not from a vacillating temperament but from humility and an ineradicable hope, derived from analogies with science, of finding the Method.

Painting had begun to move fast in Pissarro's day, faster than it had in three hundred years; he in particular must keep pace with it. The Method, if discovered, would consummate and at the same time stop the development of art, just as the fulfilment of socialism would, according to Marx, stop history. Pissarro believed in the possibility of the Method because he believed in the nineteenth century. He was naive and optimistic, a complete materialist in philosophy, a Proudhonian anarchist in politics. The counter-romantic fifties and sixties had made him, and he remained immune to the aestheticism and mysticism which came into style during the later decades of his life. Aestheticism he characterized as "a kind of romanticism more or less combined with trickery." Nature was too productive to be comprehended within it: "There must be an element of nature in my canvases which hurts certain aesthetes." Of the neo-Catholicism with which aesthetic London tempted Lucien in the nineties he wrote: "It is philosophically outside the ideas of our time." "The ideas of our time"—this was the way Pissarro liked to express himself.

With the exception of Seurat, all the neo-impressionists, among whom Pissarro belonged for a time, professed anarchism. Pissarro's, however, was of earlier date and less an avant-garde gesture—the anarchism of an artisan rather than of an artist. He was the only one of the original impressionists to concern himself with revolutionary politics, Degas was a reactionary, Cézanne a conservative, while Renoir, Manet, Monet, and Sisley seem to have been more or less indifferent. The neo-impressionists—who were the most positive agents of the so-called classical reaction in French painting during the eighteen eighties, insisting on prescribed techniques and the primacy of objective laws over individual humors—were the first after Courbet to join avant-gardism to radical politics. By their time the opposition of intrenched society to advanced art had become an established fact from which political conclusions were to be drawn. But later on, when the market for advanced art began to expand, the avant-garde again turned away from politics, and all it concluded from its experience was that bourgeois society was ugly and crass, yet could be circumvented in private life. Hence aestheticism and religiosity—while the generation of artists and writers that rose in Paris after 1900 occupied itself with neither politics nor religion but went in for experience, that is, bohemianism, when it went in for anything at all besides the practice of art.

None of the original impressionists was bohemian in his actual way of life, least of all Pissarro, a family man with seven children. He was the only notable advanced painter of his time to attempt to support a family on the proceeds of his work, even before its market appeal had been assured. This happened relatively late—later than in the cases of Renoir and Monet, who waited for financial success before acquiring families. The trials of Pissarro's course are reflected in his constant complaining about money and difficult relations with his dealers. Again and again he had to run to Paris and peddle his work to raise money. But he loved Paris, and he does not seem to have lived badly, and there may be some exaggeration in his complaints. Certainly he would fall into that rhetorical paranoia so habitual with the French, and talk of "enemies," "plots," "machinations," and so forth. But it was little more than rhetoric, and the old man usually doubted his own suspicions.

In himself he was one of the most decent persons ever to have won renown in art. Degas—who was anti-Semitic, while Pissarro was a Jew—Cézanne, and others have testified to that. He never dramatized himself as an artist, his humility was utterly sincere, and, rarest of all in a painter, he was seldom jealous, or grudging in his praise of contemporaries. The evidence is in these letters.

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Pissarro's lack of egotism was responsible perhaps for certain shortcomings of his art—its tendency toward monotony, its frequent lack of incisiveness and motion. He sacrificed too much of his temperament to whatever method he happened to be practicing. He was greatly concerned about the "synthesis," the harmony or unity of a work of art, and rightly so, for a painting, like a living organism, exists by the simultaneous relation of its parts. But the total final effect of the flat rectangle was often a paralyzing obsession for him. He allowed his perception of the free atmospheric diffusion of light to hush and merge all salient features, was too egalitarian in his treatment of the canvas—like another materialist, Courbet—and would mistake uniformity for unity. Yet his virtues redeem and more than redeem his faults. He could be a great draftsman, as his work in black and white shows. And he had a certain innocence of eye which permitted him to love phenomena the way no other painter of his time could. His relish of the pictorial, his fresh sense of what a picture does and how it relates to that which it pictures, gained him some of the qualities of primitive art without its liabilities. Pissarro was simple but not poor. He had a wealth of his beloved sensations, and could not have had that wealth without being learned in his art. Only someone who has experienced painting as a world in which it is possible to immerse as well as divert oneself can appreciate the inflections of Pissarro's painting. Shock and immediate effects are sacrificed for the sake of subtleties, passages, modulations, the mediation of contrasts. And little masterpieces are to be found complete in themselves in the dozen or so brushstrokes with which such a detail as a cab is indicated. It was only Pissarro's inhibiting preconception of unity that prevented him from treating the whole canvas in the same manner.

He was one of the few professionals to write professionally about art—from the inside, without high-flown verbiage or spectacular paradoxes. Everything is to the point—the authentic shorthand which even the layman will recognize as such. Pissarro was addressing himself to his son, upon whose equal familiarity with craft problems he could rely. The milieu and the period were under intense critical pressure, created, as is usually the case, by competing activity in the exploration of new possibilities rather than by the words of the critics. The monolithic opposition to the new painting was in itself valuable because the writers who embodied the opposition—not the academic painters—were often learned and really interested in painting. Unlike the advanced artists of the period after 1918, when the reputation of being advanced was a goal in itself and meant eventual rewards, Pissarro and his fellows had little to encourage them except the excitement of discovery. Judgment could be exercised with relative purity and was unwarped by issues accidental to art. Whatever came out of the studios aroused an immediate, keen, and uncompromising response. Comparatively few of the judgments of Pissarro and his friends have needed posterity's correction; they knew how to value Cézanne and Gauguin; and Pissarro's own work was during his lifetime put to as searching and intelligent a criticism as any it has received since. All this appears in these letters, which form one of the most fertile of all sources of insights

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CLEMENT GREENBERG

Fiction in Review

USUALLY where there is a low degree of emotional tension in a novel, we expect to find false feelings, and when a story is told as easily as James Norman Hall tells his new story, "Lost Island" (Little, Brown, $2), we are unprepared for any serious content. But the conjunction of technical smoothness with false emotions or the lack of ideas is by no means inevitable. As a matter of fact, in fiction, and even more in the movies, a great many of the smooth commercial jobs strike me as having more validity than the knotty "art" jobs. Nowadays, a display of seriousness is likely to be only a display of our newest emptiness; emotional tension has itself become a slick commercial trick.

Certainly "Lost Island" has the mark on it of a hand practiced in writing for a large unselected audience. (You will recall Mr. Hall as half of the famous "Mutiny on the Bounty" duo.) I find it much more serious, however, than such a patently "serious" novel about the war as, say, John Hersey's "A Bell for Adano." It is more thoughtful, and it seems to me to spring from deeper feelings. The story is simple: it is the brief account of the life and death of a South Sea island. We need the island for a Pacific air base; in a week we destroy the fruit of generations of peaceful living. Yet obviously, if the United States didn't take the island, Japan probably would; and as between America and Japan, or as between democracy and fascism, there is no question in Mr. Hall's mind. On the other hand, there is the island itself, with its beautiful quiet life. It has not only one of the few indigenous cultures left in the world, but it is inhabited by people who are incapable of understanding the issues for which they are sacrificed; they don't even understand the world on a map. The fact that they are victims in a cause bigger than themselves scarcely makes them any the less victims.

I think Mr. Hall makes it clear that the tragedy of his island is perhaps only a small tragedy. But it is an absolute one, and it implies a very large tragedy. For what "Lost Island" is saying—and strongly, too, though its voice is so politely pitched—is that it is a strange world we have contrived in which we have to destroy civilization in order to try to preserve it.

DIANA TRILLING

Next Week in The Nation

What the French Underground Wants
By Michael Clark

The Nation's *correspondent reports from Algiers on the Program of Action adopted by the National Council of Resistance—its detailed plan for co-operation with the Allied army and for the reconstruction of France—and on the relations of the underground with General de Gaulle.*

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IN BRIEF

AUSTRALIA AND THE PACIFIC. By Members of the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Princeton University Press. $2.50.

This little book reprints papers prepared for the Institute of Pacific Relations conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December, 1942. It does not, therefore, take account of such a major development in Australian policy as the Australian-New Zealand agreement signed on January 21, 1944. Nevertheless, it provides a good deal of sound and valuable background information which helps to make the agreement understandable and generally illuminates the Australian international position. The Commonwealth in international affairs can best be understood by remembering that it is a small nation, a member of the British Commonwealth, and a Pacific power. From these three facts, plus a knowledge of the national psychology, most of the particular policies proposed or followed can be deduced. It is the merit of these papers that they clarify understanding of each aspect of the Australian position. American readers will be particularly interested to note that it is as a Pacific power that Australia approaches the United States, but the other two facts about it deeply condition the attitudes taken up. They will also be interested in the difficulty the authors all have in defining the relative strength of the traditional close imperial ties and the rising sense of national destiny in policy formation. And, finally, they will be fascinated by the effort to measure the impact of the United States on Australia's destiny.

FILMS

IF AS a civilian, you feel the importance of experiencing what little you can about the war, you had better avoid practically every foot of fiction film which we have made about it, and you had of course better see all the newsreels and war-record films you can. At their weakest they have things to show which no non-record war films, not even the greatest that might be made, could ever hope to show. The latest and best of these films are "Attack!—the Invasion of New Britain," the first invasion newsreels, and, I am reliably told, the newsreels about the fall of Cassino. The great things in such films are nearly always single shots. The good things, which sometimes approach and could attain greatness, are the cutting, the sound, the quality of the text and voice of the commentary. But even the weakest shots, and even some of the prepared or posed ones, seem to me to have great power and wonder. In "Attack!" there are morning shots, getting men and matériel ashore in the not quite misty, sober light, which overwhelmed me with their doubleness of beauty, almost sublimity, and their almost fragrant immediacy, which made me doubt my right to be aware of the beauty at all; and these were very intelligently, restrainedly enhanced by the rather quiet sounds of metal and motors—sounds which seemed as if stopped-down by the foliage and by the quality of the light and air.

The same petrifying immediacy turns up in the newsreel of a landing barge under fire off the Normandy coast, crowded with the crouched soldiers—their almost smiling officer standing—who soon leave its protection, the housetops of the French shore standing insanely near and distinct above the end of the barge, and abruptly disclosed full-length as by the rise (or fall) of a theater curtain, as the barge opens and the men begin their hip-deep wade ashore. But fully as moving and as worthy of watching, over and over, were the shots of men receiving medical pellets and their last Communion before battle, in "Attack!"; or those of Eisenhower on the first day of invasion, grinning as uncontrollably and sympathetically as an eight-year-old; or of a disconsolate young German prisoner getting his wrist bandaged.

Such material could be used still more powerfully, I think, if we dared—and knew how—to make the central intention that of communicating war to civilians and did not stop with recording it. Stop-shots, slow-motion repetitions, and blow-ups of especially significant faces or images or bits of action, with or without comment or sound, would be one device; unrehearsed interviews would be another; a still more intrusive use of the camera in places where cameras are most unwelcome might, I uneasily believe, be a third; since the reaction of those who resent the prying would react in turn upon the consciousness and conscience of the audience. I regret tinges of slightly complacent "American" stuff in the "Attack!" commentary; this far from complacent film is well above the need for any such help. The newsreel commentary is more straightforward and less morally and psychologically appalling than it used to be but, as ought not to have to be expected, is still rather a mixture of parochial orotundity and sports-announcing. I regret still more the failure, in the invasion newsreels, to use at least one good long stretch of the extraordinary shots which were made from strafing planes; these were chopped down barely short of their most catastrophically effective few seconds. The principle is as misguided in films as it would be in music. I wish I might see a newsreel or longer film which first presented its images in the most powerful order and weaving possible, without a word of explanation; then got down, with diagrams and with recapitulated shots, to explanation. I am interested in explanations, but a thousand times more interested that an image have its full power. On the whole, however, the invasion films are well organized, well cut, and free of the affectations into which the use of more adventurous cutting might dangerously lead.

We could be getting still better record films of war if, like the British, our men were supplied with Cunningham Combat cameras instead of Eyemoes (the standard—and disliked—equipment); if, like the Germans and Russians, we had a much larger supply of telescopic lenses and more men trained to use them; and if we and the British used, per day, more than an average of 500 feet of film and assigned, per division, more than two movie camera men, plus two still camera men and two drivers. The invasion of Europe is being covered more thoroughly, we are told, than any other military operation in history; I am glad of that. But after all, the inadequate coverage of the Second Punic War hardly justifies any present complacency. It would be hard to conceive how many good camera men, with how many good cameras and how much film, would begin to be enough. As for the recording of sound and speech, both calibrated with moving images and for its own sake, that seems still to be in the mere novelty stage.

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MUSIC

THE attitude of the New Friends of Music seems to be that if I point out the discrepancies between its pretensions and its performances it doesn't want me at its concerts. That held for the three Schnabel recitals of Beethoven's music which the New Friends sponsored after the end of its chamber music series; and so I didn't hear the first recital, at which, I was reliably informed, Schnabel's playing betrayed the fact that he was very ill and should not have played at all, or the second, at which he was in his best form. But through someone's kindness I did hear the third.

I arrived at Carnegie Hall too late for the first work, one of the Sonatas Opus 2, but in time for Opus 81a ("Les Adieux"). As I listened with anticipation based on recollection I was struck, literally, by the unpleasantness of the sounds that came out of the piano. True, I was sitting on the right-center aisle, and on that side a piano is likely to sound hard and clangy in Carnegie Hall. But I had sat there before for Schnabel's performances; and though in the past there had been moments when fortissimos had been pushed beyond the capacity of the instrument, I had never before heard such consistent insensitive attack of the piano, and such consistent harsh, jangling sounds as this treatment of the instrument produced.

But at least the performance was one in which the outlines of the work were perceptible. Not so the performance of the "Diabelli" Variations that followed. I had heard Schnabel play them at least twice in Carnegie Hall; and his H.M.V. recording had made me intimately familiar with both the formidable work and his wonderfully clarifying performance. But this time variation after variation was hurled out as jumble after jumble of jangling sounds in which I was unable to discover any outline, any rhythm—which is to say, any musical sense.

Schnabel's playing always has been uneven: one moment the music has been marvelously inflected, integrated, shaped, and clarified; the next moment —it might be the next work, or even the next movement of the same work— it has been distorted, torn, confused. One moment, I would say, his musicality has been allowed to operate by mental and emotional equilibrium; the next moment it has been swamped by excessive emotional intensity or pomposousness, with the result that he has taken a finale too fast for clarity, or has loaded the phrases of a slow movement with more significance than they could carry. When calm, moreover, he has produced ravishingly beautiful sounds from the piano; when excited he has driven fortissimos beyond the limits of agreeable sound. And in the playing I heard recently the bad tendencies were merely worse.

After the second recital Virgil Thomson wrote a general statement of what he thought was wrong with Schnabel's playing of Beethoven. It was the fact that Schnabel played as a late nineteenth-century romantic the music of "a child of the late eighteenth." Specifically, "Mr. Schnabel plays as if he did not admit any difference between the expressive functions of melody and of passage work. The neutral material of music—scales, arpeggiated basses, accompanying figures, ostinato chordal backgrounds, formal cadences—he plays as if they were an intense communication, as if they were saying something as important as the main thematic material," when they serve rather "as amplification, as underpinning, frequently as mere acoustical brilliance." This robs "the melodic material, the expressive phrases, of their singing power," and makes "Beethoven sound sometimes a little meretricious as a composer. His large-scale forms include, of necessity, a large amount of material that has a structural rather than a directly expressive function. Emphasizing all this as if it were phrase by phrase of the deepest emotional portent . . . blows up the commonplaces of musical rhetoric into a form of bombast that"—and here note the two results—"makes Beethoven's early sonatas, which have many formal observances in them, sound empty of meaning, and the later ones, which sometimes skip formal transitions, sound like the improvisations of a talented youth."

The criticism would have force if only the music and the playing were what Thomson describes. He makes Beethoven a child of the late eighteenth century so that the scales and arpeggiated basses and so on may have the purely structural function in his music that they have in Mozart's; but actually I can find even in the earliest of Beethoven's sonatas very little of this material that Beethoven does not give some expressive function. And listening to Schnabel's recordings of them I find that he plays this material with no more than the expressivity that is implicit in it—not "as if it were phrase by phrase of the deepest emotional import."

Thomson evidently does not like Schnabel's playing; and I would suspect that a man who likes the French pianists' way of rattling off Mozart would not like the sharp contours and powerful tensions of Schnabel's way. I can only surmise; since Thomson himself has yet to state what he does not like in Schnabel's playing as it exists. What he has done has been to say what he does not like in Schnabel's playing of Beethoven's music as he imagines both. And in this speculation divorced from reality there is, in the end, not even logical coherence, but only arbitrary verbalization. Writing about Schnabel's playing of all Beethoven he must make his analysis apply to the performances of the late sonatas; and he does. But logically the tendency to blow up the purely formal material that he says exists in the early sonatas cannot produce any bad result in the late sonatas which, as he says, omit formal transitions; and what he says is the result of that tendency in those late sonatas has no relation to it that I can see, but is merely tacked on to it by arbitrary assertion—this in addition to its having no relation to fact, to the actual performances, which do not make the works "sound like the improvisations of a talented youth."

And further evidence of the remoteness and arbitrariness of this train of thought comes when Thomson gets down to writing about the actual performances of that second recital and tells us how good the performance of Opus 111 was. True, his way of putting it is that it "suffered least from the disproportionate emphasizing of secondary material." But then it appears that Schnabel "achieved a more convincing relation in the first movement than one currently hears between the declamatory and the lyrical subjects," and that "in the finale he produced for us that beatific tranquility that was a characteristic part of Beethoven's mature expression and that had been noticeably wanting, though there were plenty of occasions for it, in the earlier part of the evening." That is one way of dealing with one of the greatest interpretative achievements of our time.

B. H. HAGGIN

In Early Issues of The Nation
"Nippon: The Crime and Punishment of Japan." By Willis Lamott.
Reviewed by T. A. Bisson
"Cross Section." Edited by Edwin Seaver.
Reviewed by Delmore Schwartz

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No Unity with Fascism

[We print here the replies of a group of political observers who were asked to comment on Alvarez del Vayo's article, No Unity with Fascists, which appeared in The Nation *of June 3. Other comments will be printed next week.]*

Oppose All Compromise

Dear Sirs: Liberals can but admire the candor of our friend Del Vayo and praise him for it at a time when the political reasons for this universal war are being obscured, and the aims of victory systematically thrown on the scrap pile.

I was, alas, a good analyst when I wrote in your magazine of February 13, 1943, in an article on what I called the neo-legitimist policy, that this policy was based on the following tenet: all solutions, however they may vary to fit individual situations, must have one purpose—to forestall revolution in nations now dominated by fascism.

Events have proved that I was right. After the real social-appeasement contract drawn up, for reasons said to be of "military expediency," in North Africa with Giraud and Dubreuil, an attempt was made in Italy to save the House of Savoy and its associates, all second-ranking Fascists. British protection of the vacillating Spanish Catholic fascism brought further proof of the general plan. In the latter case, no military reason can be put forward. A flick of the wrist would suffice to liberate the Spanish people from the Caudillo without endangering the security of the Allied forces.

We are now in the midst of an unbelievably tragic imbroglio caused by Allied unwillingness to recognize the authority of the French National Committee of Liberation, presided over by General de Gaulle. This refusal of recognition is but a new expression of the grand strategy of social conservatism. The historic situation created by De Gaulle is a revolutionary situation, though the hero was certainly not conscious of this at first. The business international, however, has been fully aware of it.

We are now arriving at the most difficult stage in the struggle for a true victory of democracy—when convinced liberals will be made to collaborate with the life-saving operations of traditional society through fear of communism. This same fear is now being used in an astonishing manner by Soviet diplomacy.

What can, or should, disconcerted, perhaps even desperate, democrats do in such a situation? Oppose all compromises, as Del Vayo says, with all those who collaborated closely or even vaguely or only flirted with fascism, and let Soviet diplomacy play its own sometimes devilish game, of which the effective tactics are always to break up from within the resistances which it cannot put an end to by direct, classic diplomatic action.

Some of us, being deeply devoted to the cause of economic and political democracy, have always supported Soviet Russia's actions and are fearful of having to oppose certain of its latest maneuvers. We should lay aside our scruples. We need not be afraid of being violently attacked by the Communists, our allies in the common fight against fascism, when we are opposing a policy which the U. S. S. R. also disapproves but cannot modify, and of which it is consequently making Machiavellian use.

It is only by remaining firm on principles, and by making individuals responsible for their personal opportunistic actions, which are frequently so necessary in practical politics, that we can keep the esteem of our Soviet friends. Only this is important for the future.

LUCIEN VOGEL

New York, June 12

Ambiguous Operation

Dear Sirs: In the military field we are soon going to witness, as Mr. Churchill puts it, "the greatest amphibious operation of all times." What we have been witnessing in the political arena is the greatest ambiguous operation of all times. Stripped of ideological trappings, World War II advances frankly toward the attainment of its goal: which is not to make the world safe for democracy as World War I so naively proposed, but to make the world safe for the democracies—at the expense of democracy. Stalin, at the other end, has not been remiss in learning and improving a lesson for which he was seemingly well prepared. Systematically, one after the other, he has been dismantling all the ideological and universal implications of the October Revolution. His agents and loud speakers the world over have been instructed to tune in accordingly—and to dub the tune United Front. If the circle of the Russian evolution were ever to be rounded we should witness finally—even though not the renewal of the pact between German National Socialism and Russian National Communism—at least a wholesale embrace pressing to the breast of Russia Demofascism as embodied in the whole Darlan-Badoglio brood.

It is a common mistake to identify the "people's revolution" with the nation or country where one of its phases happened to culminate. Castlereagh's England did not act as a trustee of England's seventeenth-century revolutions; Theodore Roosevelt's apostleship did not rhyme with Thomas Paine's; Bonaparte had forgotten Mirabeau. To what extent Stalin is still a revolutionist on the line of Lenin and to what extent he has become a Thermidorian and a nationalist counter-revolutionist is a matter of speculation. The morrow only can give the answer. It is likely that he has not yet made his ultimate choice. It is possible that the next phase of the "people's revolution" after Hitler's fall will culminate not in Russia again but in Europe west of Russia.

Be it as it may, our critique of the "expediencies" in Downing Street and State Department would become disingenuous and factious if we chose at the same time conformism, even by silence only, to whatever expediency Stalin may contrive or indorse. Undisturbed by chorus scribblers and scarlet dervishes, while spurning any invitation to join any anti-Russian or red-baiting united front, we shall remember Mr. del Vayo's warning. Its gist, if we read him correctly, is that Stalin's Russia must be judged on its political performance, not on its revolutionary label.

G. A. BORGESE

Chicago, June 8

Not Alarmed

Dear Sirs: Throughout the war I have shared all of Del Vayo's beliefs and most of his anxieties, but in the case he now poses I am not alarmed. I believe that my friend's anxiety is due to excessive simplification of the problem, a wrong and even forgetful formulation of tactics, and a mistaken opinion concerning the Communist Party's conduct. On the whole it has done a good job, as

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has the U. S. S. R., in both the French and Italian problems, in which principles identical with those used in Yugoslavia have been applied.

First, concerning excessive simplification. The Darlan-Giraud history and the total failure of British and American liberalism to produce any real modification of Anglo-American policy are facts of prime importance. The Communists were quite right in taking our ineffectiveness into account. In that situation they counseled an "acceptance" that was in no sense "appeasement." Giraud is not yet finally removed, but the pro-fascists and defeatists and counter-revolutionaries who clustered around him have been in great measure dispersed and he himself reduced, perhaps only temporarily, in importance. I cannot believe that total refusal to "accept" the American candidate would have had better political results, while it certainly would have been disastrous for the rebuilding of a democratic French army.

Developments were quicker in Yugoslavia, but not dissimilar. At one time the Communists, principal leaders of the Partisans, were willing to work with Mihailovich. Even after the latter's disgraceful conduct, they still tried to patch up relations with the monarchy, in the hope of keeping the broadest possible political front in Yugoslavia. When overwhelming popular support was given them, the monarchy was dispensed with as far as possible. British foreign policy with regard to Yugoslavia is in striking contrast with London's attitude toward Spain. That is largely due to the correct policies worked out by the Yugoslav Communists and their allies. It is, that is to say, an oversimplification to suppose that the anti-fascist front can be built solely on the conditions which we old-time anti-fascists stipulate.

As to wrong tactics, what I mean can easily be extracted from the above. Since Britain and America were obdurate about Badoglio and the King, and since we were getting nowhere without music, there was no democratic profit in further delay. The Soviet recognition of Badoglio seems to me to have cut at least one Gordian knot. Once Badoglio was accepted, the French pattern was repeated, the *ducisti* were attacked.

It is therefore not a question of "appeasing the right at the cost of the left." There is no proof that the "pro-fascist" right has been appeased, and most of the effective left went in at once, with clarity, if with regrets.

To be sure there is danger. But Del Vayo does not seem to realize quite where that danger lies. He says that in the resistance groups "the owner of a factory has united with the local labor leaders . . . the aristocratic landowner has united with his peasants. . . . But the resistance movement has not united anti-fascists with fascists." That factory owner and that landowner, taken as symbols and like as not as persons, were aiders and abettors of fascism. Their classes were supporters of fascism. Again, the danger for creative socialist democracy (and Del Vayo and I are both Socialists) of working with Churchill in the present setup is obvious, and colossal. It lies in the whole line we are bound to follow, and it cannot be exorcised, or our tactics simplified, to accord with criteria that passionately honest dissenters might propose.

Using for the first time a polemical word with Del Vayo, I said he was "forgetful." I mean this: Back in July or August, 1941, *The Nation* and the *Daily Worker* both published Negrín's first public speech during the war. I remember it well for I was the translator. There were many things in it that caused me much anxiety. I remember Dr. Negrín's national front invited people who were actually working in the present regime's administration. It invited, I seem to remember, repentant supporters of Franco. (Exactly as the Free Germany Committee in Moscow invites "renegade" Hitlerites to come over.) At that time I found that a hard saying. But I have always assumed Del Vayo to be in agreement with his former chief.

RALPH BATES

New York, June 8

A Dangerous Line

Dear Sirs: Replying to your invitation for comment on the article by J. Alvarez del Vayo, I must say that the line of policy there presented seems to me very dangerous. What it amounts to is an ultimatum that until Churchill and Roosevelt force Badoglio out of the Italian government and Franco out of the Spanish government further support of the war will be withheld. Frankly I cannot agree that this is a course toward victory over fascism of any sort. In fact, I can think of nothing that would bring more joy to Hitler than for any considerable part of the American and British public to adopt such a policy. For this is a policy of halting the war against Hitler until every secondary problem has been solved to the satisfaction of the most advanced ideological currents—most advanced, that is, in a sense from which the necessity of war has been abstracted.

I hope and believe that Mr. del Vayo and his friends will not carry this line of thinking to its logical conclusion. But they must think fast, or they will soon find themselves in the position of withdrawing from the war effort under the slogan of "no unity with fascists."

It so happens that my record includes uncompromising struggle against Badoglio and Franco, including the most practical phases of that struggle. But when Churchill and Roosevelt agree that Badoglio must continue in the Italian government until the people of Italy have a chance to choose their own leaders, I absolutely refuse to allow a difference of opinion with them as to the wisdom of that decision to be made a stumbling-block to the further progress of the war. I find it just as easy to stomach a Badoglio who operates under British-American occupation troops and with a six-party Cabinet as to stomach the pro-fascist Lord Rennell of Rodd as head of AMG—and to be fully frank, I find it even a quite a bit easier. And to bring the discussion closer home, I am sure that Badoglio will do less harm in Italy than will our own ineffable Luigi Antonini, who hopes to arrive soon in Italy for the express purpose of splitting up the six-party democratic coalition.

If all this frankness is repugnant to your readers, I will understand it if you do not publish this solicited comment.

EARL BROWDER

New York, June 6

[We would urge our readers to read once more, as we have done, the article by Mr. del Vayo to see if they can discover any hint that under any consideration support should be withheld from the war effort. Mr. Browder's suggestion that criticism of national leadership on matters of important policy is tantamount to a threat of withdrawing support is preposterous and reveals a curiously distorted conception of the democratic process. For it implies that the national leader is, during war, in a position of absolute authority and does not derive his power from the mandate of the people. This may be true of Joseph Stalin; it is certainly not true of either Mr. Churchill or Mr. Roosevelt, despite the enormous prestige and executive authority each enjoys in his own country. It is safe to say that in England and the United States the mighty power of the democratic war effort would be appreciably weakened

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if, and at the very moment when, the people ceased to take a critical interest in the policies carried out by their elected leaders. Particularly is this the case when the policy in question seems to compromise the very democratic principle for which we fight, when, in fact, it involves unity with fascists.—EDITORS THE NATION.]

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Cross-Word Puzzle No. 69

By JACK BARRETT



ACROSS

1 Affection that is not a warmth in the heart (four words, 4, 2, 3 and 4)
10 Primitive homes with no lack of ventilation
11 Drury Lane orange-seller of Charles II's day for whom the play later became the thing (two words, 4 and 5)
12 "No tea, ever!" might be an apt anagram for one who has this
13 Oh, lord! he's found in Edward's reign!
14 Before which appellants restate their cases (two words, 6 and 6)
19 A rider, of sorts, suggests when action should start
22 Old Testament character
24 An admirer of the new
25 A sportsman who doesn't try to run before he can walk
26 No ghost writer, though he produced *Ghosts*
27 "O, I have passed a miserable night, So full of ugly sights, of ------- -------" (two words, 7 and 6)

DOWN

2 Roland's companion-in-arms
3 Is it what makes the weaker dog go to the wall?
4 The last of ninety
5 Possessor of the face which launched a thousand quips
6 *The* capital of Europe!
7 Might be any place, but there's a bit of New York in it
8 Part that works with lubrication
9 Suitable uniform for a soldier about to go to bed?
15 Washed and ironed with the under part in the center
16 White rose (anag.)
17 An office with no one in it
18 Might serve as a definition of Pisces
20 Being so slim would naturally be supple
21 Instance of uniformity of weight in nature?
23 A simpleton
24 "I weigh the man, not his title; 'tis not the king's stamp can make the ----- better" (Wycherley)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No. 68

ACROSS:—1 MINISTER; 5 PLASMA; 10 RELIANT; 11 ESCALUS; 12 LOATH; 13 LAUNDRESS; 14 NIGHT; 16 ANATOLIA; 19 MARITIME; 22 THORN; 24 REDINGOTE; 26 FLEET; 28 DELIBLE; 29 UTOPIAN; 30 SAMPLE; 31 HEARKENS.

DOWN:—1 MARYLAND; 2 NELLA; 3 SPAGHETTI; 4 ESTELLA; 6 LACED; 7 SOLFERINO; 8 ASSIST; 9 MEDUSA; 15 GRAND SLAM; 17 OUT-OF-DOOR; 18 INSTANTS; 20 IMOGEN; 21 EXECUTE; 23 GRADUS; 25 NOBEL; 27 EXILE.

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